5 resultados para Trade schools

em Boston University Digital Common


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An investigation of 24 buildings in the Greater Boston Area revealed that one-third (8 of 24) contained caulking materials with polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) content exceeding 50 ppm by weight, which is the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) specified limit above which this material is considered to be PCB bulk product waste. These buildings included schools and other public buildings. In a university building where similar levels of PCB were found in caulking material, PCB levels in indoor air ranged from 111 to 393 ng/m3; and in dust taken from the building ventilation system, < 1 ppm to 81 ppm. In this building, the U.S. EPA mandated requirements for the removal and disposal of the PCB bulk product waste as well as for confirmatory sampling to ensure that the interior and exterior of the building were decontaminated. Although U.S. EPA regulations under the Toxic Substances Control Act stipulate procedures by which PCB-contaminated materials must be handled and disposed, the regulations apparently do not require that materials such as caulking be tested to determine its PCB content. This limited investigation strongly suggests that were this testing done, many buildings would be found to contain high levels of PCBs in the building materials and potentially in the building environment. The presence of PCBs in schools is of particular concern given evidence suggesting that PCBs are developmental toxins.

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This file contains a finding aid for the Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research (BASOR) Collection. To access the collection, please contact the archivist (asorarch@bu.edu) at the American Schools of Oriental Research, located at Boston University.

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We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.