Shifting the Burden of HIV/AIDS

As the economic burden of HIV/AIDS increases in sub-Saharan Africa, the allocation of the burden among levels and sectors of societies is changing. The private sector has greater scope than government, households, or NGOs to avoid the economic burden of AIDS, and a systematic shifting of the burden away from the private sector is underway. Common practices that shift the AIDS burden from businesses to households and government include pre-employment screening, reduced employee benefits, restructured employment contracts, outsourcing of less skilled jobs, selective retrenchments, and changes in production technologies. In South Africa, more than two thirds of large employers have reduced health care benefits or required larger contributions by employees. Most firms have replaced defined benefit retirement funds, which expose the firm to large annual costs but provide long-term support for families, with defined contribution funds, which eliminate firm risk but provide little to families of younger workers who die of AIDS. Contracting out of previously permanent jobs also shields firms from costs while leaving households and government to care for affected workers and their families. Many of these changes are responses to globalization and would have occurred in the absence of AIDS, but they are devastating for employees with HIV/AIDS. This paper argues that the shifting of the economic burden of AIDS is a predictable response by business to which a thoughtful public policy response is needed. Countries should make explicit decisions about each sector’s responsibilities if a socially desirable allocation is to be achieved.

Rationing Antiretroviral Therapy for HIV/AIDS in Africa: Efficiency, Equity, and Reality

Background: Rationing of access to antiretroviral therapy already exists in sub-Saharan Africa and will intensify as national treatment programs develop. The number of people who are medically eligible for therapy will far exceed the human, infrastructural, and financial resources available, making rationing of public treatment services inevitable. Methods: We identified 15 criteria by which antiretroviral therapy could be rationed in African countries and analyzed the resulting rationing systems across 5 domains: clinical effectiveness, implementation feasibility, cost, economic efficiency, and social equity. Findings: Rationing can be explicit or implicit. Access to treatment can be explicitly targeted to priority subpopulations such as mothers of newborns, skilled workers, students, or poor people. Explicit conditions can also be set that cause differential access, such as residence in a designated geographic area, co-payment, access to testing, or a demonstrated commitment to adhere to therapy. Implicit rationing on the basis of first-come, first-served or queuing will arise when no explicit system is enforced; implicit systems almost always allow a high degree of queue-jumping by the elite. There is a direct tradeoff between economic efficiency and social equity. Interpretation: Rationing is inevitable in most countries for some period of time. Without deliberate social policy decisions, implicit rationing systems that are neither efficient nor equitable will prevail. Governments that make deliberate choices, and then explain and defend those choices to their constituencies, are more likely to achieve a socially desirable outcome from the large investments now being made than are those that allow queuing and queue-jumping to dominate.