10 resultados para Security protocols
em Boston University Digital Common
Resumo:
The proliferation of mobile computers and wireless networks requires the design of future distributed real-time applications to recognize and deal with the significant asymmetry between downstream and upstream communication capacities, and the significant disparity between server and client storage capacities. Recent research work proposed the use of Broadcast Disks as a scalable mechanism to deal with this problem. In this paper, we propose a new broadcast disks protocol, based on our Adaptive Information Dispersal Algorithm (AIDA). Our protocol is different from previous broadcast disks protocols in that it improves communication timeliness, fault-tolerance, and security, while allowing for a finer control of multiplexing of prioritized data (broadcast frequencies). We start with a general introduction of broadcast disks. Next, we propose broadcast disk organizations that are suitable for real-time applications. Next, we present AIDA and show its fault-tolerance and security properties. We conclude the paper with the description and analysis of AIDA-based broadcast disks organizations that achieve both timeliness and fault-tolerance, while preserving downstream communication capacity.
Resumo:
Recent measurements of local-area and wide-area traffic have shown that network traffic exhibits variability at a wide range of scales self-similarity. In this paper, we examine a mechanism that gives rise to self-similar network traffic and present some of its performance implications. The mechanism we study is the transfer of files or messages whose size is drawn from a heavy-tailed distribution. We examine its effects through detailed transport-level simulations of multiple TCP streams in an internetwork. First, we show that in a "realistic" client/server network environment i.e., one with bounded resources and coupling among traffic sources competing for resources the degree to which file sizes are heavy-tailed can directly determine the degree of traffic self-similarity at the link level. We show that this causal relationship is not significantly affected by changes in network resources (bottleneck bandwidth and buffer capacity), network topology, the influence of cross-traffic, or the distribution of interarrival times. Second, we show that properties of the transport layer play an important role in preserving and modulating this relationship. In particular, the reliable transmission and flow control mechanisms of TCP (Reno, Tahoe, or Vegas) serve to maintain the long-range dependency structure induced by heavy-tailed file size distributions. In contrast, if a non-flow-controlled and unreliable (UDP-based) transport protocol is used, the resulting traffic shows little self-similar characteristics: although still bursty at short time scales, it has little long-range dependence. If flow-controlled, unreliable transport is employed, the degree of traffic self-similarity is positively correlated with the degree of throttling at the source. Third, in exploring the relationship between file sizes, transport protocols, and self-similarity, we are also able to show some of the performance implications of self-similarity. We present data on the relationship between traffic self-similarity and network performance as captured by performance measures including packet loss rate, retransmission rate, and queueing delay. Increased self-similarity, as expected, results in degradation of performance. Queueing delay, in particular, exhibits a drastic increase with increasing self-similarity. Throughput-related measures such as packet loss and retransmission rate, however, increase only gradually with increasing traffic self-similarity as long as reliable, flow-controlled transport protocol is used.
Resumo:
As new multi-party edge services are deployed on the Internet, application-layer protocols with complex communication models and event dependencies are increasingly being specified and adopted. To ensure that such protocols (and compositions thereof with existing protocols) do not result in undesirable behaviors (e.g., livelocks) there needs to be a methodology for the automated checking of the "safety" of these protocols. In this paper, we present ingredients of such a methodology. Specifically, we show how SPIN, a tool from the formal systems verification community, can be used to quickly identify problematic behaviors of application-layer protocols with non-trivial communication models—such as HTTP with the addition of the "100 Continue" mechanism. As a case study, we examine several versions of the specification for the Continue mechanism; our experiments mechanically uncovered multi-version interoperability problems, including some which motivated revisions of HTTP/1.1 and some which persist even with the current version of the protocol. One such problem resembles a classic degradation-of-service attack, but can arise between well-meaning peers. We also discuss how the methods we employ can be used to make explicit the requirements for hardening a protocol's implementation against potentially malicious peers, and for verifying an implementation's interoperability with the full range of allowable peer behaviors.
Resumo:
Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDS) monitor 802.11 wireless frames (Layer-2) in an attempt to detect misuse. What distinguishes a WIDS from a traditional Network IDS is the ability to utilize the broadcast nature of the medium to reconstruct the physical location of the offending party, as opposed to its possibly spoofed (MAC addresses) identity in cyber space. Traditional Wireless Network Security Systems are still heavily anchored in the digital plane of "cyber space" and hence cannot be used reliably or effectively to derive the physical identity of an intruder in order to prevent further malicious wireless broadcasts, for example by escorting an intruder off the premises based on physical evidence. In this paper, we argue that Embedded Sensor Networks could be used effectively to bridge the gap between digital and physical security planes, and thus could be leveraged to provide reciprocal benefit to surveillance and security tasks on both planes. Toward that end, we present our recent experience integrating wireless networking security services into the SNBENCH (Sensor Network workBench). The SNBENCH provides an extensible framework that enables the rapid development and automated deployment of Sensor Network applications on a shared, embedded sensing and actuation infrastructure. The SNBENCH's extensible architecture allows an engineer to quickly integrate new sensing and response capabilities into the SNBENCH framework, while high-level languages and compilers allow novice SN programmers to compose SN service logic, unaware of the lower-level implementation details of tools on which their services rely. In this paper we convey the simplicity of the service composition through concrete examples that illustrate the power and potential of Wireless Security Services that span both the physical and digital plane.
Resumo:
Transport protocols are an integral part of the inter-process communication (IPC) service used by application processes to communicate over the network infrastructure. With almost 30 years of research on transport, one would have hoped that we have a good handle on the problem. Unfortunately, that is not true. As the Internet continues to grow, new network technologies and new applications continue to emerge putting transport protocols in a never-ending flux as they are continuously adapted for these new environments. In this work, we propose a clean-slate transport architecture that renders all possible transport solutions as simply combinations of policies instantiated on a single common structure. We identify a minimal set of mechanisms that once instantiated with the appropriate policies allows any transport solution to be realized. Given our proposed architecture, we contend that there are no more transport protocols to design—only policies to specify. We implement our transport architecture in a declarative language, Network Datalog (NDlog), making the specification of different transport policies easy, compact, reusable, dynamically configurable and potentially verifiable. In NDlog, transport state is represented as database relations, state is updated/queried using database operations, and transport policies are specified using declarative rules. We identify limitations with NDlog that could potentially threaten the correctness of our specification. We propose several language extensions to NDlog that would significantly improve the programmability of transport policies.
Resumo:
This position paper outlines a new network architecture, i.e., a style of construction that identifies the objects and how they relate. We do not specify particular protocol implementations or specific interfaces and policies. After all, it should be possible to change protocols in an architecture without changing the architecture. Rather we outline the repeating patterns and structures, and how the proposed model would cope with the challenges faced by today's Internet (and that of the future). Our new architecture is based on the following principle: Application processes communicate via a distributed inter-process communication (IPC) facility. The application processes that make up this facility provide a protocol that implements an IPC mechanism, and a protocol for managing distributed IPC (routing, security and other management tasks). Existing implementation strategies, algorithms, and protocols can be cast and used within our proposed new structure.
Resumo:
As the commoditization of sensing, actuation and communication hardware increases, so does the potential for dynamically tasked sense and respond networked systems (i.e., Sensor Networks or SNs) to replace existing disjoint and inflexible special-purpose deployments (closed-circuit security video, anti-theft sensors, etc.). While various solutions have emerged to many individual SN-centric challenges (e.g., power management, communication protocols, role assignment), perhaps the largest remaining obstacle to widespread SN deployment is that those who wish to deploy, utilize, and maintain a programmable Sensor Network lack the programming and systems expertise to do so. The contributions of this thesis centers on the design, development and deployment of the SN Workbench (snBench). snBench embodies an accessible, modular programming platform coupled with a flexible and extensible run-time system that, together, support the entire life-cycle of distributed sensory services. As it is impossible to find a one-size-fits-all programming interface, this work advocates the use of tiered layers of abstraction that enable a variety of high-level, domain specific languages to be compiled to a common (thin-waist) tasking language; this common tasking language is statically verified and can be subsequently re-translated, if needed, for execution on a wide variety of hardware platforms. snBench provides: (1) a common sensory tasking language (Instruction Set Architecture) powerful enough to express complex SN services, yet simple enough to be executed by highly constrained resources with soft, real-time constraints, (2) a prototype high-level language (and corresponding compiler) to illustrate the utility of the common tasking language and the tiered programming approach in this domain, (3) an execution environment and a run-time support infrastructure that abstract a collection of heterogeneous resources into a single virtual Sensor Network, tasked via this common tasking language, and (4) novel formal methods (i.e., static analysis techniques) that verify safety properties and infer implicit resource constraints to facilitate resource allocation for new services. This thesis presents these components in detail, as well as two specific case-studies: the use of snBench to integrate physical and wireless network security, and the use of snBench as the foundation for semester-long student projects in a graduate-level Software Engineering course.
Resumo:
The Java programming language has been widely described as secure by design. Nevertheless, a number of serious security vulnerabilities have been discovered in Java, particularly in the component known as the Bytecode Verifier. This paper describes a method for representing Java security constraints using the Alloy modeling language. It further describes a system for performing a security analysis on any block of Java bytecodes by converting the bytes into relation initializers in Alloy. Any counterexamples found by the Alloy analyzer correspond directly to insecure code. Analysis of a real-world malicious applet is given to demonstrate the efficacy of the approach.
Resumo:
The TCP/IP architecture was originally designed without taking security measures into consideration. Over the years, it has been subjected to many attacks, which has led to many patches to counter them. Our investigations into the fundamental principles of networking have shown that carefully following an abstract model of Interprocess Communication (IPC) addresses many problems [1]. Guided by this IPC principle, we designed a clean-slate Recursive INternet Architecture (RINA) [2]. In this paper, we show how, without the aid of cryptographic techniques, the bare-bones architecture of RINA can resist most of the security attacks faced by TCP/IP. We also show how hard it is for an intruder to compromise RINA. Then, we show how RINA inherently supports security policies in a more manageable, on-demand basis, in contrast to the rigid, piecemeal approach of TCP/IP.
Resumo:
Version 1.1 of the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) was principally developed as a means for reducing both document transfer latency and network traffic. The rationale for the performance enhancements in HTTP/1.1 is based on the assumption that the network is the bottleneck in Web transactions. In practice, however, the Web server can be the primary source of document transfer latency. In this paper, we characterize and compare the performance of HTTP/1.0 and HTTP/1.1 in terms of throughput at the server and transfer latency at the client. Our approach is based on considering a broader set of bottlenecks in an HTTP transfer; we examine how bottlenecks in the network, CPU, and in the disk system affect the relative performance of HTTP/1.0 versus HTTP/1.1. We show that the network demands under HTTP/1.1 are somewhat lower than HTTP/1.0, and we quantify those differences in terms of packets transferred, server congestion window size and data bytes per packet. We show that when the CPU is the bottleneck, there is relatively little difference in performance between HTTP/1.0 and HTTP/1.1. Surprisingly, we show that when the disk system is the bottleneck, performance using HTTP/1.1 can be much worse than with HTTP/1.0. Based on these observations, we suggest a connection management policy for HTTP/1.1 that can improve throughput, decrease latency, and keep network traffic low when the disk system is the bottleneck.