M^2RC: Multiplicative-increase/additive-decrease Multipath Routing Control for Wireless Sensor Networks

Routing protocols in wireless sensor networks (WSN) face two main challenges: first, the challenging environments in which WSNs are deployed negatively affect the quality of the routing process. Therefore, routing protocols for WSNs should recognize and react to node failures and packet losses. Second, sensor nodes are battery-powered, which makes power a scarce resource. Routing protocols should optimize power consumption to prolong the lifetime of the WSN. In this paper, we present a new adaptive routing protocol for WSNs, we call it M^2RC. M^2RC has two phases: mesh establishment phase and data forwarding phase. In the first phase, M^2RC establishes the routing state to enable multipath data forwarding. In the second phase, M^2RC forwards data packets from the source to the sink. Targeting hop-by-hop reliability, an M^2RC forwarding node waits for an acknowledgement (ACK) that its packets were correctly received at the next neighbor. Based on this feedback, an M^2RC node applies multiplicative-increase/additive-decrease (MIAD) to control the number of neighbors targeted by its packet broadcast. We simulated M^2RC in the ns-2 simulator and compared it to GRAB, Max-power, and Min-power routing schemes. Our simulations show that M^2RC achieves the highest throughput with at least 10-30% less consumed power per delivered report in scenarios where a certain number of nodes unexpectedly fail.

Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.