3 resultados para Rational objective
em Boston University Digital Common
Resumo:
A method for reconstructing 3D rational B-spline surfaces from multiple views is proposed. The method takes advantage of the projective invariance properties of rational B-splines. Given feature correspondences in multiple views, the 3D surface is reconstructed via a four step framework. First, corresponding features in each view are given an initial surface parameter value (s; t), and a 2D B-spline is fitted in each view. After this initialization, an iterative minimization procedure alternates between updating the 2D B-spline control points and re-estimating each feature's (s; t). Next, a non-linear minimization method is used to upgrade the 2D B-splines to 2D rational B-splines, and obtain a better fit. Finally, a factorization method is used to reconstruct the 3D B-spline surface given 2D B-splines in each view. This surface recovery method can be applied in both the perspective and orthographic case. The orthographic case allows the use of additional constraints in the recovery. Experiments with real and synthetic imagery demonstrate the efficacy of the approach for the orthographic case.
Resumo:
A method for reconstruction of 3D rational B-spline surfaces from multiple views is proposed. Given corresponding features in multiple views, though not necessarily visible in all views, the surface is reconstructed. First 2D B-spline patches are fitted to each view. The 3D B-splines and projection matricies can then be extracted from the 2D B-splines using factorization methods. The surface fit is then further refined via an iterative procedure. Finally, a hierarchal fitting scheme is proposed to allow modeling of complex surfaces by means of knot insertion. Experiments with real imagery demonstrate the efficacy of the approach.
Resumo:
We introduce Collocation Games as the basis of a general framework for modeling, analyzing, and facilitating the interactions between the various stakeholders in distributed systems in general, and in cloud computing environments in particular. Cloud computing enables fixed-capacity (processing, communication, and storage) resources to be offered by infrastructure providers as commodities for sale at a fixed cost in an open marketplace to independent, rational parties (players) interested in setting up their own applications over the Internet. Virtualization technologies enable the partitioning of such fixed-capacity resources so as to allow each player to dynamically acquire appropriate fractions of the resources for unencumbered use. In such a paradigm, the resource management problem reduces to that of partitioning the entire set of applications (players) into subsets, each of which is assigned to fixed-capacity cloud resources. If the infrastructure and the various applications are under a single administrative domain, this partitioning reduces to an optimization problem whose objective is to minimize the overall deployment cost. In a marketplace, in which the infrastructure provider is interested in maximizing its own profit, and in which each player is interested in minimizing its own cost, it should be evident that a global optimization is precisely the wrong framework. Rather, in this paper we use a game-theoretic framework in which the assignment of players to fixed-capacity resources is the outcome of a strategic "Collocation Game". Although we show that determining the existence of an equilibrium for collocation games in general is NP-hard, we present a number of simplified, practically-motivated variants of the collocation game for which we establish convergence to a Nash Equilibrium, and for which we derive convergence and price of anarchy bounds. In addition to these analytical results, we present an experimental evaluation of implementations of some of these variants for cloud infrastructures consisting of a collection of multidimensional resources of homogeneous or heterogeneous capacities. Experimental results using trace-driven simulations and synthetically generated datasets corroborate our analytical results and also illustrate how collocation games offer a feasible distributed resource management alternative for autonomic/self-organizing systems, in which the adoption of a global optimization approach (centralized or distributed) would be neither practical nor justifiable.