Institutional Repositories, Policies, and Disruption

For many librarians, institutional repositories (IRs) promised significant change for academic libraries. We envisioned enlarging collection development scope to include locally produced scholarship and an expansion of library services to embrace scholarly publication and distribution. However, at the University of Rochester, as at many other institutions, this transformational technology was introduced in the conservative, controlled manner associated with stereotypical librarian culture, and so these expected changes never materialized. In this case study, we focus on the creation of our institutional repository (a potentially disruptive technology) and how its success was hampered by our organizational culture, manifested as a lengthy and complicated set of policies. In the following pages, we briefly describe our repository project, talk about our original policies, look at the ways those policies impeded our project, and discuss the disruption of those policies and the benefits in user uptake that resulted.

Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.

QoS Controllers for the Internet

In this position paper, we review basic control strategies that machines acting as "traffic controllers" could deploy in order to improve the management of Internet services. Such traffic controllers are likely to spur the widespread emergence of advanced applications, which have (so far) been hindered by the inability of the networking infrastructure to deliver on the promise of Quality-of-Service (QoS).