An Institutional Approach to Donor Control: From Dyadic Ties to a Field‐Level Analysis

Literature on the nonprofit sector focuses on charities and their interactions with clients or governmental agencies; donors are studied less often. Studies on philanthropy do examine donors but tend to focus on microlevel factors to explain their behavior. This study, in contrast, draws on institutional theory to show that macrolevel factors affect donor behavior. It also extends the institutional framework by examining the field‐level configurations in which donors and fundraisers are embedded. Employing the case of workplace charity, this new model highlights how the composition of the organizational field structures fundraisers and donors alike, shaping fundraisers’ strategies of solicitation and, therefore, the extent of donor control.

An Admission Control Paradigm for Real-time Databases

We propose and evaluate an admission control paradigm for RTDBS, in which a transaction is submitted to the system as a pair of processes: a primary task, and a recovery block. The execution requirements of the primary task are not known a priori, whereas those of the recovery block are known a priori. Upon the submission of a transaction, an Admission Control Mechanism is employed to decide whether to admit or reject that transaction. Once admitted, a transaction is guaranteed to finish executing before its deadline. A transaction is considered to have finished executing if exactly one of two things occur: Either its primary task is completed (successful commitment), or its recovery block is completed (safe termination). Committed transactions bring a profit to the system, whereas a terminated transaction brings no profit. The goal of the admission control and scheduling protocols (e.g., concurrency control, I/O scheduling, memory management) employed in the system is to maximize system profit. We describe a number of admission control strategies and contrast (through simulations) their relative performance.

Concurrency Admission Control Management in ACCORD

We propose and evaluate admission control mechanisms for ACCORD, an Admission Control and Capacity Overload management Real-time Database framework-an architecture and a transaction model-for hard deadline RTDB systems. The system architecture consists of admission control and scheduling components which provide early notification of failure to submitted transactions that are deemed not valuable or incapable of completing on time. In particular, our Concurrency Admission Control Manager (CACM) ensures that transactions which are admitted do not overburden the system by requiring a level of concurrency that is not sustainable. The transaction model consists of two components: a primary task and a compensating task. The execution requirements of the primary task are not known a priori, whereas those of the compensating task are known a priori. Upon the submission of a transaction, the Admission Control Mechanisms are employed to decide whether to admit or reject that transaction. Once admitted, a transaction is guaranteed to finish executing before its deadline. A transaction is considered to have finished executing if exactly one of two things occur: Either its primary task is completed (successful commitment), or its compensating task is completed (safe termination). Committed transactions bring a profit to the system, whereas a terminated transaction brings no profit. The goal of the admission control and scheduling protocols (e.g., concurrency control, I/O scheduling, memory management) employed in the system is to maximize system profit. In that respect, we describe a number of concurrency admission control strategies and contrast (through simulations) their relative performance.

Collocation Games and Their Application to Distributed Resource Management

We introduce Collocation Games as the basis of a general framework for modeling, analyzing, and facilitating the interactions between the various stakeholders in distributed systems in general, and in cloud computing environments in particular. Cloud computing enables fixed-capacity (processing, communication, and storage) resources to be offered by infrastructure providers as commodities for sale at a fixed cost in an open marketplace to independent, rational parties (players) interested in setting up their own applications over the Internet. Virtualization technologies enable the partitioning of such fixed-capacity resources so as to allow each player to dynamically acquire appropriate fractions of the resources for unencumbered use. In such a paradigm, the resource management problem reduces to that of partitioning the entire set of applications (players) into subsets, each of which is assigned to fixed-capacity cloud resources. If the infrastructure and the various applications are under a single administrative domain, this partitioning reduces to an optimization problem whose objective is to minimize the overall deployment cost. In a marketplace, in which the infrastructure provider is interested in maximizing its own profit, and in which each player is interested in minimizing its own cost, it should be evident that a global optimization is precisely the wrong framework. Rather, in this paper we use a game-theoretic framework in which the assignment of players to fixed-capacity resources is the outcome of a strategic "Collocation Game". Although we show that determining the existence of an equilibrium for collocation games in general is NP-hard, we present a number of simplified, practically-motivated variants of the collocation game for which we establish convergence to a Nash Equilibrium, and for which we derive convergence and price of anarchy bounds. In addition to these analytical results, we present an experimental evaluation of implementations of some of these variants for cloud infrastructures consisting of a collection of multidimensional resources of homogeneous or heterogeneous capacities. Experimental results using trace-driven simulations and synthetically generated datasets corroborate our analytical results and also illustrate how collocation games offer a feasible distributed resource management alternative for autonomic/self-organizing systems, in which the adoption of a global optimization approach (centralized or distributed) would be neither practical nor justifiable.