The Retail Market for Bednets in Kenya: How Well Is It Working?

Background Achieving the goals set by Roll Back Malaria and the Government of Kenya for use of insecticide treated bednets (ITNs) will require that the private retail market for nets and insecticide treatments grow substantially. This paper applies some basic concepts of market structure and pricing to a set of recently-collected retail price data from Kenya in order to answer the question, “How well are Kenyan retail markets for ITNs working?” Methods Data on the availability and prices of ITNs at a wide range of retail outlets throughout Kenya were collected in January 2002, and vendors and manufacturers were interviewed regarding market structure. Findings Untreated nets are manufactured in Kenya by a number of companies and are widely available in large and medium-sized towns. Availability in smaller villages is limited. There is relatively little geographic price variation, and nets can be found at competitive prices in towns and cities. Marketing margins on prices appear to be within normal ranges. No finished nets are imported. Few pre-treated nets or net+treatment combinations are available, with the exception of the subsidized Supanet/Power Tab combination marketed by a donor-funded social marketing project. Conclusions Retail markets for untreated nets in Kenya are well established and appear to be competitive. Markets for treated nets and insecticide treatment kits are not well established. The role of subsidized ITN marketing projects should be monitored to ensure that these projects support, rather than hinder, the development of retail markets.

Pricing Algorithms For a Two-sided Internet Advertisement Market

The Google AdSense Program is a successful internet advertisement program where Google places contextual adverts on third-party websites and shares the resulting revenue with each publisher. Advertisers have budgets and bid on ad slots while publishers set reserve prices for the ad slots on their websites. Following previous modelling efforts, we model the program as a two-sided market with advertisers on one side and publishers on the other. We show a reduction from the Generalised Assignment Problem (GAP) to the problem of computing the revenue maximising allocation and pricing of publisher slots under a first-price auction. GAP is APX-hard but a (1-1/e) approximation is known. We compute truthful and revenue-maximizing prices and allocation of ad slots to advertisers under a second-price auction. The auctioneer's revenue is within (1-1/e) second-price optimal.