The African slave trade / by Thomas Fowell Buxton.

Digitized by Google

Communicable Memory and Lazy Barriers for Bulk Synchronous Parallelism in BSPk

Communication and synchronization stand as the dual bottlenecks in the performance of parallel systems, and especially those that attempt to alleviate the programming burden by incurring overhead in these two domains. We formulate the notions of communicable memory and lazy barriers to help achieve efficient communication and synchronization. These concepts are developed in the context of BSPk, a toolkit library for programming networks of workstations|and other distributed memory architectures in general|based on the Bulk Synchronous Parallel (BSP) model. BSPk emphasizes efficiency in communication by minimizing local memory-to-memory copying, and in barrier synchronization by not forcing a process to wait unless it needs remote data. Both the message passing (MP) and distributed shared memory (DSM) programming styles are supported in BSPk. MP helps processes efficiently exchange short-lived unnamed data values, when the identity of either the sender or receiver is known to the other party. By contrast, DSM supports communication between processes that may be mutually anonymous, so long as they can agree on variable names in which to store shared temporary or long-lived data.

Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.