8 resultados para National Institute of Mental Health (U.S.)
em Boston University Digital Common
Resumo:
Temporal structure in skilled, fluent action exists at several nested levels. At the largest scale considered here, short sequences of actions that are planned collectively in prefrontal cortex appear to be queued for performance by a cyclic competitive process that operates in concert with a parallel analog representation that implicitly specifies the relative priority of elements of the sequence. At an intermediate scale, single acts, like reaching to grasp, depend on coordinated scaling of the rates at which many muscles shorten or lengthen in parallel. To ensure success of acts such as catching an approaching ball, such parallel rate scaling, which appears to be one function of the basal ganglia, must be coupled to perceptual variables, such as time-to-contact. At a fine scale, within each act, desired rate scaling can be realized only if precisely timed muscle activations first accelerate and then decelerate the limbs, to ensure that muscle length changes do not under- or over-shoot the amounts needed for the precise acts. Each context of action may require a much different timed muscle activation pattern than similar contexts. Because context differences that require different treatment cannot be known in advance, a formidable adaptive engine-the cerebellum-is needed to amplify differences within, and continuosly search, a vast parallel signal flow, in order to discover contextual "leading indicators" of when to generate distinctive parallel patterns of analog signals. From some parts of the cerebellum, such signals controls muscles. But a recent model shows how the lateral cerebellum, such signals control muscles. But a recent model shows how the lateral cerebellum may serve the competitive queuing system (in frontal cortex) as a repository of quickly accessed long-term sequence memories. Thus different parts of the cerebellum may use the same adaptive engine system design to serve the lowest and the highest of the three levels of temporal structure treated. If so, no one-to-one mapping exists between levels of temporal structure and major parts of the brain. Finally, recent data cast doubt on network-delay models of cerebellar adaptive timing.
Resumo:
A growing wave of behavioral studies, using a wide variety of paradigms that were introduced or greatly refined in recent years, has generated a new wealth of parametric observations about serial order behavior. What was a mere trickle of neurophysiological studies has grown to a more steady stream of probes of neural sites and mechanisms underlying sequential behavior. Moreover, simulation models of serial behavior generation have begun to open a channel to link cellular dynamics with cognitive and behavioral dynamics. Here we summarize the major results from prominent sequence learning and performance tasks, namely immediate serial recall, typing, 2XN, discrete sequence production, and serial reaction time. These populate a continuum from higher to lower degrees of internal control of sequential organization. The main movement classes covered are speech and keypressing, both involving small amplitude movements that are very amenable to parametric study. A brief synopsis of classes of serial order models, vis-à-vis the detailing of major effects found in the behavioral data, leads to a focus on competitive queuing (CQ) models. Recently, the many behavioral predictive successes of CQ models have been joined by successful prediction of distinctively patterend electrophysiological recordings in prefrontal cortex, wherein parallel activation dynamics of multiple neural ensembles strikingly matches the parallel dynamics predicted by CQ theory. An extended CQ simulation model-the N-STREAMS neural network model-is then examined to highlight issues in ongoing attemptes to accomodate a broader range of behavioral and neurophysiological data within a CQ-consistent theory. Important contemporary issues such as the nature of working memory representations for sequential behavior, and the development and role of chunks in hierarchial control are prominent throughout.
Resumo:
Temporal structure is skilled, fluent action exists at several nested levels. At the largest scale considered here, short sequences of actions that are planned collectively in prefronatal cortex appear to be queued for performance by a cyclic competitive process that operates in concert with a parallel analog representation that implicitly specifies the relative priority of elements of the sequence. At an intermediate scale, single acts, like reaching to grasp, depend on coordinated scaling of the rates at which many muscles shorten or lengthen in parallel. To ensure success of acts such as catching an approaching ball, such parallel rate scaling, which appears to be one function of the basal ganglia, must be coupled to perceptual variables such as time-to-contact. At a finer scale, within each act, desired rate scaling can be realized only if precisely timed muscle activations first accelerate and then decelerate the limbs, to ensure that muscle length changes do not under- or over- shoot the amounts needed for precise acts. Each context of action may require a different timed muscle activation pattern than similar contexts. Because context differences that require different treatment cannot be known in advance, a formidable adaptive engine-the cerebellum-is needed to amplify differences within, and continuosly search, a vast parallel signal flow, in order to discover contextual "leading indicators" of when to generate distinctive patterns of analog signals. From some parts of the cerebellum, such signals control muscles. But a recent model shows how the lateral cerebellum may serve the competitive queuing system (frontal cortex) as a repository of quickly accessed long-term sequence memories. Thus different parts of the cerebellum may use the same adaptive engine design to serve the lowest and highest of the three levels of temporal structure treated. If so, no one-to-one mapping exists between leveels of temporal structure and major parts of the brain. Finally, recent data cast doubt on network-delay models of cerebellar adaptive timing.
Resumo:
The concepts of declarative memory and procedural memory have been used to distinguish two basic types of learning. A neural network model suggests how such memory processes work together as recognition learning, reinforcement learning, and sensory-motor learning take place during adaptive behaviors. To coordinate these processes, the hippocampal formation and cerebellum each contain circuits that learn to adaptively time their outputs. Within the model, hippocampal timing helps to maintain attention on motivationally salient goal objects during variable task-related delays, and cerebellar timing controls the release of conditioned responses. This property is part of the model's description of how cognitive-emotional interactions focus attention on motivationally valued cues, and how this process breaks down due to hippocampal ablation. The model suggests that the hippocampal mechanisms that help to rapidly draw attention to salient cues could prematurely release motor commands were not the release of these commands adaptively timed by the cerebellum. The model hippocampal system modulates cortical recognition learning without actually encoding the representational information that the cortex encodes. These properties avoid the difficulties faced by several models that propose a direct hippocampal role in recognition learning. Learning within the model hippocampal system controls adaptive timing and spatial orientation. Model properties hereby clarify how hippocampal ablations cause amnesic symptoms and difficulties with tasks which combine task delays, novelty detection, and attention towards goal objects amid distractions. When these model recognition, reinforcement, sensory-motor, and timing processes work together, they suggest how the brain can accomplish conditioning of multiple sensory events to delayed rewards, as during serial compound conditioning.
Resumo:
An investigation of 24 buildings in the Greater Boston Area revealed that one-third (8 of 24) contained caulking materials with polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) content exceeding 50 ppm by weight, which is the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) specified limit above which this material is considered to be PCB bulk product waste. These buildings included schools and other public buildings. In a university building where similar levels of PCB were found in caulking material, PCB levels in indoor air ranged from 111 to 393 ng/m3; and in dust taken from the building ventilation system, < 1 ppm to 81 ppm. In this building, the U.S. EPA mandated requirements for the removal and disposal of the PCB bulk product waste as well as for confirmatory sampling to ensure that the interior and exterior of the building were decontaminated. Although U.S. EPA regulations under the Toxic Substances Control Act stipulate procedures by which PCB-contaminated materials must be handled and disposed, the regulations apparently do not require that materials such as caulking be tested to determine its PCB content. This limited investigation strongly suggests that were this testing done, many buildings would be found to contain high levels of PCBs in the building materials and potentially in the building environment. The presence of PCBs in schools is of particular concern given evidence suggesting that PCBs are developmental toxins.
Resumo:
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (HD051804)
Resumo:
BACKGROUND: In a 1994 Ninth Circuit decision on the remand of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Judge Alex Kosinski wrote that science done for the purpose of litigation should be subject to more stringent standards of admissibility than other science. OBJECTIVES: We analyze this proposition by considering litigation-generated science as a subset of science involving conflict of interest. DISCUSSION: Judge Kosinski's formulation suggests there may be reasons to treat science involving conflict of interest differently but raises questions about whether litigation-generated science should be singled out. In particular we discuss the similar problems raised by strategically motivated science done in anticipation of possible future litigation or otherwise designed to benefit the sponsor and ask what special treatment, if any, should be given to science undertaken to support existing or potential future litigation. CONCLUSION: The problems with litigation-generated science are not special. On the contrary, they are very general and apply to much or most science that is relevant and reliable in the courtroom setting.