Exploiting Phonological Constraints for Handshape Inference in ASL Video

Handshape is a key articulatory parameter in sign language, and thus handshape recognition from signing video is essential for sign recognition and retrieval. Handshape transitions within monomorphemic lexical signs (the largest class of signs in signed languages) are governed by phonological rules. For example, such transitions normally involve either closing or opening of the hand (i.e., to exclusively use either folding or unfolding of the palm and one or more fingers). Furthermore, akin to allophonic variations in spoken languages, both inter- and intra- signer variations in the production of specific handshapes are observed. We propose a Bayesian network formulation to exploit handshape co-occurrence constraints, also utilizing information about allophonic variations to aid in handshape recognition. We propose a fast non-rigid image alignment method to gain improved robustness to handshape appearance variations during computation of observation likelihoods in the Bayesian network. We evaluate our handshape recognition approach on a large dataset of monomorphemic lexical signs. We demonstrate that leveraging linguistic constraints on handshapes results in improved handshape recognition accuracy. As part of the overall project, we are collecting and preparing for dissemination a large corpus (three thousand signs from three native signers) of American Sign Language (ASL) video. The video have been annotated using SignStream® [Neidle et al.] with labels for linguistic information such as glosses, morphological properties and variations, and start/end handshapes associated with each ASL sign.

Collocation Games and Their Application to Distributed Resource Management

We introduce Collocation Games as the basis of a general framework for modeling, analyzing, and facilitating the interactions between the various stakeholders in distributed systems in general, and in cloud computing environments in particular. Cloud computing enables fixed-capacity (processing, communication, and storage) resources to be offered by infrastructure providers as commodities for sale at a fixed cost in an open marketplace to independent, rational parties (players) interested in setting up their own applications over the Internet. Virtualization technologies enable the partitioning of such fixed-capacity resources so as to allow each player to dynamically acquire appropriate fractions of the resources for unencumbered use. In such a paradigm, the resource management problem reduces to that of partitioning the entire set of applications (players) into subsets, each of which is assigned to fixed-capacity cloud resources. If the infrastructure and the various applications are under a single administrative domain, this partitioning reduces to an optimization problem whose objective is to minimize the overall deployment cost. In a marketplace, in which the infrastructure provider is interested in maximizing its own profit, and in which each player is interested in minimizing its own cost, it should be evident that a global optimization is precisely the wrong framework. Rather, in this paper we use a game-theoretic framework in which the assignment of players to fixed-capacity resources is the outcome of a strategic "Collocation Game". Although we show that determining the existence of an equilibrium for collocation games in general is NP-hard, we present a number of simplified, practically-motivated variants of the collocation game for which we establish convergence to a Nash Equilibrium, and for which we derive convergence and price of anarchy bounds. In addition to these analytical results, we present an experimental evaluation of implementations of some of these variants for cloud infrastructures consisting of a collection of multidimensional resources of homogeneous or heterogeneous capacities. Experimental results using trace-driven simulations and synthetically generated datasets corroborate our analytical results and also illustrate how collocation games offer a feasible distributed resource management alternative for autonomic/self-organizing systems, in which the adoption of a global optimization approach (centralized or distributed) would be neither practical nor justifiable.

Implications of Selfish Neighbor Selection in Overlay Networks

In a typical overlay network for routing or content sharing, each node must select a fixed number of immediate overlay neighbors for routing traffic or content queries. A selfish node entering such a network would select neighbors so as to minimize the weighted sum of expected access costs to all its destinations. Previous work on selfish neighbor selection has built intuition with simple models where edges are undirected, access costs are modeled by hop-counts, and nodes have potentially unbounded degrees. However, in practice, important constraints not captured by these models lead to richer games with substantively and fundamentally different outcomes. Our work models neighbor selection as a game involving directed links, constraints on the number of allowed neighbors, and costs reflecting both network latency and node preference. We express a node's "best response" wiring strategy as a k-median problem on asymmetric distance, and use this formulation to obtain pure Nash equilibria. We experimentally examine the properties of such stable wirings on synthetic topologies, as well as on real topologies and maps constructed from PlanetLab and AS-level Internet measurements. Our results indicate that selfish nodes can reap substantial performance benefits when connecting to overlay networks composed of non-selfish nodes. On the other hand, in overlays that are dominated by selfish nodes, the resulting stable wirings are optimized to such great extent that even non-selfish newcomers can extract near-optimal performance through naive wiring strategies.