4 resultados para Money market
em Boston University Digital Common
Resumo:
sermon text; MS Word document
Resumo:
Background Achieving the goals set by Roll Back Malaria and the Government of Kenya for use of insecticide treated bednets (ITNs) will require that the private retail market for nets and insecticide treatments grow substantially. This paper applies some basic concepts of market structure and pricing to a set of recently-collected retail price data from Kenya in order to answer the question, “How well are Kenyan retail markets for ITNs working?” Methods Data on the availability and prices of ITNs at a wide range of retail outlets throughout Kenya were collected in January 2002, and vendors and manufacturers were interviewed regarding market structure. Findings Untreated nets are manufactured in Kenya by a number of companies and are widely available in large and medium-sized towns. Availability in smaller villages is limited. There is relatively little geographic price variation, and nets can be found at competitive prices in towns and cities. Marketing margins on prices appear to be within normal ranges. No finished nets are imported. Few pre-treated nets or net+treatment combinations are available, with the exception of the subsidized Supanet/Power Tab combination marketed by a donor-funded social marketing project. Conclusions Retail markets for untreated nets in Kenya are well established and appear to be competitive. Markets for treated nets and insecticide treatment kits are not well established. The role of subsidized ITN marketing projects should be monitored to ensure that these projects support, rather than hinder, the development of retail markets.
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The Google AdSense Program is a successful internet advertisement program where Google places contextual adverts on third-party websites and shares the resulting revenue with each publisher. Advertisers have budgets and bid on ad slots while publishers set reserve prices for the ad slots on their websites. Following previous modelling efforts, we model the program as a two-sided market with advertisers on one side and publishers on the other. We show a reduction from the Generalised Assignment Problem (GAP) to the problem of computing the revenue maximising allocation and pricing of publisher slots under a first-price auction. GAP is APX-hard but a (1-1/e) approximation is known. We compute truthful and revenue-maximizing prices and allocation of ad slots to advertisers under a second-price auction. The auctioneer's revenue is within (1-1/e) second-price optimal.
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We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.