Pricing Algorithms For a Two-sided Internet Advertisement Market

The Google AdSense Program is a successful internet advertisement program where Google places contextual adverts on third-party websites and shares the resulting revenue with each publisher. Advertisers have budgets and bid on ad slots while publishers set reserve prices for the ad slots on their websites. Following previous modelling efforts, we model the program as a two-sided market with advertisers on one side and publishers on the other. We show a reduction from the Generalised Assignment Problem (GAP) to the problem of computing the revenue maximising allocation and pricing of publisher slots under a first-price auction. GAP is APX-hard but a (1-1/e) approximation is known. We compute truthful and revenue-maximizing prices and allocation of ad slots to advertisers under a second-price auction. The auctioneer's revenue is within (1-1/e) second-price optimal.

TCP Optimization through FEC, ARQ and Transmission Power Tradeoffs

TCP performance degrades when end-to-end connections extend over wireless connections-links which are characterized by high bit error rate and intermittent connectivity. Such link characteristics can significantly degrade TCP performance as the TCP sender assumes wireless losses to be congestion losses resulting in unnecessary congestion control actions. Link errors can be reduced by increasing transmission power, code redundancy (FEC) or number of retransmissions (ARQ). But increasing power costs resources, increasing code redundancy reduces available channel bandwidth and increasing persistency increases end-to-end delay. The paper proposes a TCP optimization through proper tuning of power management, FEC and ARQ in wireless environments (WLAN and WWAN). In particular, we conduct analytical and numerical analysis taking into "wireless-aware" TCP) performance under different settings. Our results show that increasing power, redundancy and/or retransmission levels always improves TCP performance by reducing link-layer losses. However, such improvements are often associated with cost and arbitrary improvement cannot be realized without paying a lot in return. It is therefore important to consider some kind of net utility function that should be optimized, thus maximizing throughput at the least possible cost.

A Virtual Deadline Scheduler for Window-Constrained Service Guarantees

This paper presents a new approach to window-constrained scheduling, suitable for multimedia and weakly-hard real-time systems. We originally developed an algorithm, called Dynamic Window-Constrained Scheduling (DWCS), that attempts to guarantee no more than x out of y deadlines are missed for real-time jobs such as periodic CPU tasks, or delay-constrained packet streams. While DWCS is capable of generating a feasible window-constrained schedule that utilizes 100% of resources, it requires all jobs to have the same request periods (or intervals between successive service requests). We describe a new algorithm called Virtual Deadline Scheduling (VDS), that provides window-constrained service guarantees to jobs with potentially different request periods, while still maximizing resource utilization. VDS attempts to service m out of k job instances by their virtual deadlines, that may be some finite time after the corresponding real-time deadlines. Notwithstanding, VDS is capable of outperforming DWCS and similar algorithms, when servicing jobs with potentially different request periods. Additionally, VDS is able to limit the extent to which a fraction of all job instances are serviced late. Results from simulations show that VDS can provide better window-constrained service guarantees than other related algorithms, while still having as good or better delay bounds for all scheduled jobs. Finally, an implementation of VDS in the Linux kernel compares favorably against DWCS for a range of scheduling loads.

Collocation Games and Their Application to Distributed Resource Management

We introduce Collocation Games as the basis of a general framework for modeling, analyzing, and facilitating the interactions between the various stakeholders in distributed systems in general, and in cloud computing environments in particular. Cloud computing enables fixed-capacity (processing, communication, and storage) resources to be offered by infrastructure providers as commodities for sale at a fixed cost in an open marketplace to independent, rational parties (players) interested in setting up their own applications over the Internet. Virtualization technologies enable the partitioning of such fixed-capacity resources so as to allow each player to dynamically acquire appropriate fractions of the resources for unencumbered use. In such a paradigm, the resource management problem reduces to that of partitioning the entire set of applications (players) into subsets, each of which is assigned to fixed-capacity cloud resources. If the infrastructure and the various applications are under a single administrative domain, this partitioning reduces to an optimization problem whose objective is to minimize the overall deployment cost. In a marketplace, in which the infrastructure provider is interested in maximizing its own profit, and in which each player is interested in minimizing its own cost, it should be evident that a global optimization is precisely the wrong framework. Rather, in this paper we use a game-theoretic framework in which the assignment of players to fixed-capacity resources is the outcome of a strategic "Collocation Game". Although we show that determining the existence of an equilibrium for collocation games in general is NP-hard, we present a number of simplified, practically-motivated variants of the collocation game for which we establish convergence to a Nash Equilibrium, and for which we derive convergence and price of anarchy bounds. In addition to these analytical results, we present an experimental evaluation of implementations of some of these variants for cloud infrastructures consisting of a collection of multidimensional resources of homogeneous or heterogeneous capacities. Experimental results using trace-driven simulations and synthetically generated datasets corroborate our analytical results and also illustrate how collocation games offer a feasible distributed resource management alternative for autonomic/self-organizing systems, in which the adoption of a global optimization approach (centralized or distributed) would be neither practical nor justifiable.

Fuzzy ART

Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) models are real-time neural networks for category learning, pattern recognition, and prediction. Unsupervised fuzzy ART and supervised fuzzy ARTMAP synthesize fuzzy logic and ART networks by exploiting the formal similarity between the computations of fuzzy subsethood and the dynamics of ART category choice, search, and learning. Fuzzy ART self-organizes stable recognition categories in response to arbitrary sequences of analog or binary input patterns. It generalizes the binary ART 1 model, replacing the set-theoretic: intersection (∩) with the fuzzy intersection (∧), or component-wise minimum. A normalization procedure called complement coding leads to a symmetric: theory in which the fuzzy inter:>ec:tion and the fuzzy union (∨), or component-wise maximum, play complementary roles. Complement coding preserves individual feature amplitudes while normalizing the input vector, and prevents a potential category proliferation problem. Adaptive weights :otart equal to one and can only decrease in time. A geometric interpretation of fuzzy AHT represents each category as a box that increases in size as weights decrease. A matching criterion controls search, determining how close an input and a learned representation must be for a category to accept the input as a new exemplar. A vigilance parameter (p) sets the matching criterion and determines how finely or coarsely an ART system will partition inputs. High vigilance creates fine categories, represented by small boxes. Learning stops when boxes cover the input space. With fast learning, fixed vigilance, and an arbitrary input set, learning stabilizes after just one presentation of each input. A fast-commit slow-recode option allows rapid learning of rare events yet buffers memories against recoding by noisy inputs. Fuzzy ARTMAP unites two fuzzy ART networks to solve supervised learning and prediction problems. A Minimax Learning Rule controls ARTMAP category structure, conjointly minimizing predictive error and maximizing code compression. Low vigilance maximizes compression but may therefore cause very different inputs to make the same prediction. When this coarse grouping strategy causes a predictive error, an internal match tracking control process increases vigilance just enough to correct the error. ARTMAP automatically constructs a minimal number of recognition categories, or "hidden units," to meet accuracy criteria. An ARTMAP voting strategy improves prediction by training the system several times using different orderings of the input set. Voting assigns confidence estimates to competing predictions given small, noisy, or incomplete training sets. ARPA benchmark simulations illustrate fuzzy ARTMAP dynamics. The chapter also compares fuzzy ARTMAP to Salzberg's Nested Generalized Exemplar (NGE) and to Simpson's Fuzzy Min-Max Classifier (FMMC); and concludes with a summary of ART and ARTMAP applications.