A Christian analytic approach of marriage through abduction among the Basotho people of Lesotho: A challenge for pastoral care ministry

University of Pretoria / MA Dissertation / Department of Practical Theology / Advised by Prof M J S Masango

Clergy, crusified within the body of Christ - a challenge to pastoral care

M.A. Thesis / University of Pretoria / Department of Practical Theology / Advised by Prof M Masango

Litigation-Generated Science: Why Should We Care?

BACKGROUND: In a 1994 Ninth Circuit decision on the remand of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Judge Alex Kosinski wrote that science done for the purpose of litigation should be subject to more stringent standards of admissibility than other science. OBJECTIVES: We analyze this proposition by considering litigation-generated science as a subset of science involving conflict of interest. DISCUSSION: Judge Kosinski's formulation suggests there may be reasons to treat science involving conflict of interest differently but raises questions about whether litigation-generated science should be singled out. In particular we discuss the similar problems raised by strategically motivated science done in anticipation of possible future litigation or otherwise designed to benefit the sponsor and ask what special treatment, if any, should be given to science undertaken to support existing or potential future litigation. CONCLUSION: The problems with litigation-generated science are not special. On the contrary, they are very general and apply to much or most science that is relevant and reliable in the courtroom setting.

Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.