User-Level Sandboxing: a Safe and Efficient Mechanism for Extensibility

Extensible systems allow services to be configured and deployed for the specific needs of individual applications. This paper describes a safe and efficient method for user-level extensibility that requires only minimal changes to the kernel. A sandboxing technique is described that supports multiple logical protection domains within the same address space at user-level. This approach allows applications to register sandboxed code with the system, that may be executed in the context of any process. Our approach differs from other implementations that require special hardware support, such as segmentation or tagged translation look-aside buffers (TLBs), to either implement multiple protection domains in a single address space, or to support fast switching between address spaces. Likewise, we do not require the entire system to be written in a type-safe language, to provide fine-grained protection domains. Instead, our user-level sandboxing technique requires only paged-based virtual memory support, and the requirement that extension code is written either in a type-safe language, or by a trusted source. Using a fast method of upcalls, we show how our sandboxing technique for implementing logical protection domains provides significant performance improvements over traditional methods of invoking user-level services. Experimental results show our approach to be an efficient method for extensibility, with inter-protection domain communication costs close to those of hardware-based solutions leveraging segmentation.

Efficient End-Host Architecture for High Performance Communication Using User-level Sandboxing

Current low-level networking abstractions on modern operating systems are commonly implemented in the kernel to provide sufficient performance for general purpose applications. However, it is desirable for high performance applications to have more control over the networking subsystem to support optimizations for their specific needs. One approach is to allow networking services to be implemented at user-level. Unfortunately, this typically incurs costs due to scheduling overheads and unnecessary data copying via the kernel. In this paper, we describe a method to implement efficient application-specific network service extensions at user-level, that removes the cost of scheduling and provides protected access to lower-level system abstractions. We present a networking implementation that, with minor modifications to the Linux kernel, passes data between "sandboxed" extensions and the Ethernet device without copying or processing in the kernel. Using this mechanism, we put a customizable networking stack into a user-level sandbox and show how it can be used to efficiently process and forward data via proxies, or intermediate hosts, in the communication path of high performance data streams. Unlike other user-level networking implementations, our method makes no special hardware requirements to avoid unnecessary data copies. Results show that we achieve a substantial increase in throughput over comparable user-space methods using our networking stack implementation.

An Efficient User-Level Shared Memory Mechanism for Application-Specific Extensions

This paper focuses on an efficient user-level method for the deployment of application-specific extensions, using commodity operating systems and hardware. A sandboxing technique is described that supports multiple extensions within a shared virtual address space. Applications can register sandboxed code with the system, so that it may be executed in the context of any process. Such code may be used to implement generic routines and handlers for a class of applications, or system service extensions that complement the functionality of the core kernel. Using our approach, application-specific extensions can be written like conventional user-level code, utilizing libraries and system calls, with the advantage that they may be executed without the traditional costs of scheduling and context-switching between process-level protection domains. No special hardware support such as segmentation or tagged translation look-aside buffers (TLBs) is required. Instead, our ``user-level sandboxing'' mechanism requires only paged-based virtual memory support, given that sandboxed extensions are either written by a trusted source or are guaranteed to be memory-safe (e.g., using type-safe languages). Using a fast method of upcalls, we show how our mechanism provides significant performance improvements over traditional methods of invoking user-level services. As an application of our approach, we have implemented a user-level network subsystem that avoids data copying via the kernel and, in many cases, yields far greater network throughput than kernel-level approaches.