A modern pioneer in Korea the life story of Henry G. Appenzeller

http://www.archive.org/details/amodernpioneerin00grifuoft

A history of Indian missions on the Pacific coast : Oregon, Washington and Idaho / by Myron Eells ; with an introduction by G.H. Atkinson.

http://www.archive.org/details/missionspacific00eellrich

The Churchman's prayer manual : for use at prayer meetings, mission services, conventions, Bible classes, study circles and other occasions of united prayer, as well as for private use compiled by G. R. Bullock-Webster.

http://www.archive.org/details/churchmansprayer00bulluoft

John Innocent: A story of mission work in North China, by G.T. Candlin.

http://www.archive.org/details/johninnocent00canduoft

Islam and missions : being papers read at the Second Missionary Conference on behalf of the Mohammedan World at Lucknow, January 23-28, 1911 / edited by E.M. Wherry, S.M. Zwemer, C.G. Mylrea.

http://www.archive.org/details/islamandmissions012033mbp

Kabir and the Kabir Panth / by G.H. Westcott.

http://www.archive.org/details/kabirandthekabir020544mbp

G. Ernest Wright Papers, 1957-1972

This collection primarily contains correspondence from Wright’s years as president of ASOR. Material dates as far back as 1957, and proceed into the early 1970’s. Some of Wright’s more notable correspondents include William F. Albright, A. Henry Detweiler, Paul W. Lapp, William Reed, and Dean Seiler. Subject-specific correspondence includes records of expenditures, budget planning, corporate memberships, and the Jerusalem School.

Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.