3 resultados para IPC
em Boston University Digital Common
Resumo:
This position paper outlines a new network architecture, i.e., a style of construction that identifies the objects and how they relate. We do not specify particular protocol implementations or specific interfaces and policies. After all, it should be possible to change protocols in an architecture without changing the architecture. Rather we outline the repeating patterns and structures, and how the proposed model would cope with the challenges faced by today's Internet (and that of the future). Our new architecture is based on the following principle: Application processes communicate via a distributed inter-process communication (IPC) facility. The application processes that make up this facility provide a protocol that implements an IPC mechanism, and a protocol for managing distributed IPC (routing, security and other management tasks). Existing implementation strategies, algorithms, and protocols can be cast and used within our proposed new structure.
Resumo:
Transport protocols are an integral part of the inter-process communication (IPC) service used by application processes to communicate over the network infrastructure. With almost 30 years of research on transport, one would have hoped that we have a good handle on the problem. Unfortunately, that is not true. As the Internet continues to grow, new network technologies and new applications continue to emerge putting transport protocols in a never-ending flux as they are continuously adapted for these new environments. In this work, we propose a clean-slate transport architecture that renders all possible transport solutions as simply combinations of policies instantiated on a single common structure. We identify a minimal set of mechanisms that once instantiated with the appropriate policies allows any transport solution to be realized. Given our proposed architecture, we contend that there are no more transport protocols to design—only policies to specify. We implement our transport architecture in a declarative language, Network Datalog (NDlog), making the specification of different transport policies easy, compact, reusable, dynamically configurable and potentially verifiable. In NDlog, transport state is represented as database relations, state is updated/queried using database operations, and transport policies are specified using declarative rules. We identify limitations with NDlog that could potentially threaten the correctness of our specification. We propose several language extensions to NDlog that would significantly improve the programmability of transport policies.
Resumo:
The TCP/IP architecture was originally designed without taking security measures into consideration. Over the years, it has been subjected to many attacks, which has led to many patches to counter them. Our investigations into the fundamental principles of networking have shown that carefully following an abstract model of Interprocess Communication (IPC) addresses many problems [1]. Guided by this IPC principle, we designed a clean-slate Recursive INternet Architecture (RINA) [2]. In this paper, we show how, without the aid of cryptographic techniques, the bare-bones architecture of RINA can resist most of the security attacks faced by TCP/IP. We also show how hard it is for an intruder to compromise RINA. Then, we show how RINA inherently supports security policies in a more manageable, on-demand basis, in contrast to the rigid, piecemeal approach of TCP/IP.