SEP: A Stable Election Protocol for clustered heterogeneous wireless sensor networks

We study the impact of heterogeneity of nodes, in terms of their energy, in wireless sensor networks that are hierarchically clustered. In these networks some of the nodes become cluster heads, aggregate the data of their cluster members and transmit it to the sink. We assume that a percentage of the population of sensor nodes is equipped with additional energy resources-this is a source of heterogeneity which may result from the initial setting or as the operation of the network evolves. We also assume that the sensors are randomly (uniformly) distributed and are not mobile, the coordinates of the sink and the dimensions of the sensor field are known. We show that the behavior of such sensor networks becomes very unstable once the first node dies, especially in the presence of node heterogeneity. Classical clustering protocols assume that all the nodes are equipped with the same amount of energy and as a result, they can not take full advantage of the presence of node heterogeneity. We propose SEP, a heterogeneous-aware protocol to prolong the time interval before the death of the first node (we refer to as stability period), which is crucial for many applications where the feedback from the sensor network must be reliable. SEP is based on weighted election probabilities of each node to become cluster head according to the remaining energy in each node. We show by simulation that SEP always prolongs the stability period compared to (and that the average throughput is greater than) the one obtained using current clustering protocols. We conclude by studying the sensitivity of our SEP protocol to heterogeneity parameters capturing energy imbalance in the network. We found that SEP yields longer stability region for higher values of extra energy brought by more powerful nodes.

Open Issues on TCP for Mobile Computing

We discuss the design principles of TCP within the context of heterogeneous wired/wireless networks and mobile networking. We identify three shortcomings in TCP's behavior: (i) the protocol's error detection mechanism, which does not distinguish different types of errors and thus does not suffice for heterogeneous wired/wireless environments, (ii) the error recovery, which is not responsive to the distinctive characteristics of wireless networks such as transient or burst errors due to handoffs and fading channels, and (iii) the protocol strategy, which does not control the tradeoff between performance measures such as goodput and energy consumption, and often entails a wasteful effort of retransmission and energy expenditure. We discuss a solution-framework based on selected research proposals and the associated evaluation criteria for the suggested modifications. We highlight an important angle that did not attract the required attention so far: the need for new performance metrics, appropriate for evaluating the impact of protocol strategies on battery-powered devices.

Collocation Games and Their Application to Distributed Resource Management

We introduce Collocation Games as the basis of a general framework for modeling, analyzing, and facilitating the interactions between the various stakeholders in distributed systems in general, and in cloud computing environments in particular. Cloud computing enables fixed-capacity (processing, communication, and storage) resources to be offered by infrastructure providers as commodities for sale at a fixed cost in an open marketplace to independent, rational parties (players) interested in setting up their own applications over the Internet. Virtualization technologies enable the partitioning of such fixed-capacity resources so as to allow each player to dynamically acquire appropriate fractions of the resources for unencumbered use. In such a paradigm, the resource management problem reduces to that of partitioning the entire set of applications (players) into subsets, each of which is assigned to fixed-capacity cloud resources. If the infrastructure and the various applications are under a single administrative domain, this partitioning reduces to an optimization problem whose objective is to minimize the overall deployment cost. In a marketplace, in which the infrastructure provider is interested in maximizing its own profit, and in which each player is interested in minimizing its own cost, it should be evident that a global optimization is precisely the wrong framework. Rather, in this paper we use a game-theoretic framework in which the assignment of players to fixed-capacity resources is the outcome of a strategic "Collocation Game". Although we show that determining the existence of an equilibrium for collocation games in general is NP-hard, we present a number of simplified, practically-motivated variants of the collocation game for which we establish convergence to a Nash Equilibrium, and for which we derive convergence and price of anarchy bounds. In addition to these analytical results, we present an experimental evaluation of implementations of some of these variants for cloud infrastructures consisting of a collection of multidimensional resources of homogeneous or heterogeneous capacities. Experimental results using trace-driven simulations and synthetically generated datasets corroborate our analytical results and also illustrate how collocation games offer a feasible distributed resource management alternative for autonomic/self-organizing systems, in which the adoption of a global optimization approach (centralized or distributed) would be neither practical nor justifiable.