Conciousness Expanded

Many kinds of human states of consciousness have been distinguished, including colourful or anomalous experiences that are felt to have spiritual significance by most people who have them. The neurosciences have isolated brain-state correlates for some of these colourful states of consciousness, thereby strengthening the hypothesis that these experiences are mediated by the brain. This result both challenges metaphysically dualist accounts of human nature and suggests that any adequate causal explanation of colourful experiences would have to make detailed reference to the evolutionary and genetic conditions that give rise to brains capable of such conscious phenomena. This paper quickly surveys types of conscious states and neurological interpretations of them. In order to deal with the question of the significance of such experiences, the paper then attempts to identify evolutionary and genetic constraints on proposals for causal explanations of such experiences. The conclusion is that a properly sensitive evolutionary account of human consciousness supports a rebuttal of the argument that the cognitive content of colourful experiences is pure delusion, but that this evolutionary account also heavily constrains what might be inferred theologically from such experiences. They are not necessarily delusory, therefore, but they are often highly misleading. Their significance must be construed consistently with this conclusion.

Dopaminergic and Non-Dopaminergic Value Systems in Conditioning and Outcome-Specific Revaluation

Animals are motivated to choose environmental options that can best satisfy current needs. To explain such choices, this paper introduces the MOTIVATOR (Matching Objects To Internal Values Triggers Option Revaluations) neural model. MOTIVATOR describes cognitiveemotional interactions between higher-order sensory cortices and an evaluative neuraxis composed of the hypothalamus, amygdala, and orbitofrontal cortex. Given a conditioned stimulus (CS), the model amygdala and lateral hypothalamus interact to calculate the expected current value of the subjective outcome that the CS predicts, constrained by the current state of deprivation or satiation. The amygdala relays the expected value information to orbitofrontal cells that receive inputs from anterior inferotemporal cells, and medial orbitofrontal cells that receive inputs from rhinal cortex. The activations of these orbitofrontal cells code the subjective values of objects. These values guide behavioral choices. The model basal ganglia detect errors in CS-specific predictions of the value and timing of rewards. Excitatory inputs from the pedunculopontine nucleus interact with timed inhibitory inputs from model striosomes in the ventral striatum to regulate dopamine burst and dip responses from cells in the substantia nigra pars compacta and ventral tegmental area. Learning in cortical and striatal regions is strongly modulated by dopamine. The model is used to address tasks that examine food-specific satiety, Pavlovian conditioning, reinforcer devaluation, and simultaneous visual discrimination. Model simulations successfully reproduce discharge dynamics of known cell types, including signals that predict saccadic reaction times and CS-dependent changes in systolic blood pressure.