Historical sketch of the Flathead Indian nation from the year 1813 to 1890 : embracing the history of the establishment of St. Mary's Indian Mission in the Bitter Root Valley, Mont. : with sketches of the missionary life of Father Ravalli and other early missionaries : wars of the Blackfeet and Flatheads and sketches of history, trapping and trading in the early days / by Peter Ronan.

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Possible Exotic Phases in the One-Dimensional Extended Hubbard Model

We investigate numerically the ground state phase diagram of the one-dimensional extended Hubbard model, including an on--site interaction U and a nearest--neighbor interaction V. We focus on the ground state phases of the model in the V >> U region, where previous studies have suggested the possibility of dominant superconducting pairing fluctuations before the system phase separates at a critical value V=V_PS. Using quantum Monte Carlo methods on lattices much larger than in previous Lanczos diagonalization studies, we determine the boundary of phase separation, the Luttinger Liquid correlation exponent K_rho, and other correlation functions in this region. We find that phase separation occurs for V significantly smaller than previously reported. In addition, for negative U, we find that a uniform state re-enters from phase separation as the electron density is increased towards half filling. For V < V_PS, our results show that superconducting fluctuations are not dominant. The system behaves asymptotically as a Luttinger Liquid with K_rho < 1, but we also find strong low-energy (but gapped) charge-density fluctuations at a momentum not expected for a standard Luttinger Liquid.

Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.