Generating Representative ISP Technologies From First-Principles

Understanding and modeling the factors that underlie the growth and evolution of network topologies are basic questions that impact capacity planning, forecasting, and protocol research. Early topology generation work focused on generating network-wide connectivity maps, either at the AS-level or the router-level, typically with an eye towards reproducing abstract properties of observed topologies. But recently, advocates of an alternative "first-principles" approach question the feasibility of realizing representative topologies with simple generative models that do not explicitly incorporate real-world constraints, such as the relative costs of router configurations, into the model. Our work synthesizes these two lines by designing a topology generation mechanism that incorporates first-principles constraints. Our goal is more modest than that of constructing an Internet-wide topology: we aim to generate representative topologies for single ISPs. However, our methods also go well beyond previous work, as we annotate these topologies with representative capacity and latency information. Taking only demand for network services over a given region as input, we propose a natural cost model for building and interconnecting PoPs and formulate the resulting optimization problem faced by an ISP. We devise hill-climbing heuristics for this problem and demonstrate that the solutions we obtain are quantitatively similar to those in measured router-level ISP topologies, with respect to both topological properties and fault-tolerance.

Declarative Transport: No More Transport Protocols to Design, Only Policies to Specify

Transport protocols are an integral part of the inter-process communication (IPC) service used by application processes to communicate over the network infrastructure. With almost 30 years of research on transport, one would have hoped that we have a good handle on the problem. Unfortunately, that is not true. As the Internet continues to grow, new network technologies and new applications continue to emerge putting transport protocols in a never-ending flux as they are continuously adapted for these new environments. In this work, we propose a clean-slate transport architecture that renders all possible transport solutions as simply combinations of policies instantiated on a single common structure. We identify a minimal set of mechanisms that once instantiated with the appropriate policies allows any transport solution to be realized. Given our proposed architecture, we contend that there are no more transport protocols to design—only policies to specify. We implement our transport architecture in a declarative language, Network Datalog (NDlog), making the specification of different transport policies easy, compact, reusable, dynamically configurable and potentially verifiable. In NDlog, transport state is represented as database relations, state is updated/queried using database operations, and transport policies are specified using declarative rules. We identify limitations with NDlog that could potentially threaten the correctness of our specification. We propose several language extensions to NDlog that would significantly improve the programmability of transport policies.

Assessing the Security of a Clean-Slate Internet Architecture

The TCP/IP architecture was originally designed without taking security measures into consideration. Over the years, it has been subjected to many attacks, which has led to many patches to counter them. Our investigations into the fundamental principles of networking have shown that carefully following an abstract model of Interprocess Communication (IPC) addresses many problems [1]. Guided by this IPC principle, we designed a clean-slate Recursive INternet Architecture (RINA) [2]. In this paper, we show how, without the aid of cryptographic techniques, the bare-bones architecture of RINA can resist most of the security attacks faced by TCP/IP. We also show how hard it is for an intruder to compromise RINA. Then, we show how RINA inherently supports security policies in a more manageable, on-demand basis, in contrast to the rigid, piecemeal approach of TCP/IP.