Analysis of OD Flows (Raw Data)

In a recent paper, Structural Analysis of Network Traffic Flows, we analyzed the set of Origin Destination traffic flows from the Sprint-Europe and Abilene backbone networks. This report presents the complete set of results from analyzing data from both networks. The results in this report are specific to the Sprint-1 and Abilene datasets studied in the above paper. The following results are presented here: 1 Rows of Principal Matrix (V) 2 1.1 Sprint-1 Dataset ................................ 2 1.2 Abilene Dataset.................................. 9 2 Set of Eigenflows 14 2.1 Sprint-1 Dataset.................................. 14 2.2 Abilene Dataset................................... 21 3 Classifying Eigenflows 26 3.1 Sprint-1 Dataset.................................. 26 3.2 Abilene Datase.................................... 44

Diagnosing Network-Wide Traffic Anomalies

Anomalies are unusual and significant changes in a network's traffic levels, which can often involve multiple links. Diagnosing anomalies is critical for both network operators and end users. It is a difficult problem because one must extract and interpret anomalous patterns from large amounts of high-dimensional, noisy data. In this paper we propose a general method to diagnose anomalies. This method is based on a separation of the high-dimensional space occupied by a set of network traffic measurements into disjoint subspaces corresponding to normal and anomalous network conditions. We show that this separation can be performed effectively using Principal Component Analysis. Using only simple traffic measurements from links, we study volume anomalies and show that the method can: (1) accurately detect when a volume anomaly is occurring; (2) correctly identify the underlying origin-destination (OD) flow which is the source of the anomaly; and (3) accurately estimate the amount of traffic involved in the anomalous OD flow. We evaluate the method's ability to diagnose (i.e., detect, identify, and quantify) both existing and synthetically injected volume anomalies in real traffic from two backbone networks. Our method consistently diagnoses the largest volume anomalies, and does so with a very low false alarm rate.

Characterization of Network-Wide Anomalies in Traffic Flows

Detecting and understanding anomalies in IP networks is an open and ill-defined problem. Toward this end, we have recently proposed the subspace method for anomaly diagnosis. In this paper we present the first large-scale exploration of the power of the subspace method when applied to flow traffic. An important aspect of this approach is that it fuses information from flow measurements taken throughout a network. We apply the subspace method to three different types of sampled flow traffic in a large academic network: multivariate timeseries of byte counts, packet counts, and IP-flow counts. We show that each traffic type brings into focus a different set of anomalies via the subspace method. We illustrate and classify the set of anomalies detected. We find that almost all of the anomalies detected represent events of interest to network operators. Furthermore, the anomalies span a remarkably wide spectrum of event types, including denial of service attacks (single-source and distributed), flash crowds, port scanning, downstream traffic engineering, high-rate flows, worm propagation, and network outage.

Bayesian Packet Loss Detection for TCP

One of TCP's critical tasks is to determine which packets are lost in the network, as a basis for control actions (flow control and packet retransmission). Modern TCP implementations use two mechanisms: timeout, and fast retransmit. Detection via timeout is necessarily a time-consuming operation; fast retransmit, while much quicker, is only effective for a small fraction of packet losses. In this paper we consider the problem of packet loss detection in TCP more generally. We concentrate on the fact that TCP's control actions are necessarily triggered by inference of packet loss, rather than conclusive knowledge. This suggests that one might analyze TCP's packet loss detection in a standard inferencing framework based on probability of detection and probability of false alarm. This paper makes two contributions to that end: First, we study an example of more general packet loss inference, namely optimal Bayesian packet loss detection based on round trip time. We show that for long-lived flows, it is frequently possible to achieve high detection probability and low false alarm probability based on measured round trip time. Second, we construct an analytic performance model that incorporates general packet loss inference into TCP. We show that for realistic detection and false alarm probabilities (as are achievable via our Bayesian detector) and for moderate packet loss rates, the use of more general packet loss inference in TCP can improve throughput by as much as 25%.