Collocation Games and Their Application to Distributed Resource Management

We introduce Collocation Games as the basis of a general framework for modeling, analyzing, and facilitating the interactions between the various stakeholders in distributed systems in general, and in cloud computing environments in particular. Cloud computing enables fixed-capacity (processing, communication, and storage) resources to be offered by infrastructure providers as commodities for sale at a fixed cost in an open marketplace to independent, rational parties (players) interested in setting up their own applications over the Internet. Virtualization technologies enable the partitioning of such fixed-capacity resources so as to allow each player to dynamically acquire appropriate fractions of the resources for unencumbered use. In such a paradigm, the resource management problem reduces to that of partitioning the entire set of applications (players) into subsets, each of which is assigned to fixed-capacity cloud resources. If the infrastructure and the various applications are under a single administrative domain, this partitioning reduces to an optimization problem whose objective is to minimize the overall deployment cost. In a marketplace, in which the infrastructure provider is interested in maximizing its own profit, and in which each player is interested in minimizing its own cost, it should be evident that a global optimization is precisely the wrong framework. Rather, in this paper we use a game-theoretic framework in which the assignment of players to fixed-capacity resources is the outcome of a strategic "Collocation Game". Although we show that determining the existence of an equilibrium for collocation games in general is NP-hard, we present a number of simplified, practically-motivated variants of the collocation game for which we establish convergence to a Nash Equilibrium, and for which we derive convergence and price of anarchy bounds. In addition to these analytical results, we present an experimental evaluation of implementations of some of these variants for cloud infrastructures consisting of a collection of multidimensional resources of homogeneous or heterogeneous capacities. Experimental results using trace-driven simulations and synthetically generated datasets corroborate our analytical results and also illustrate how collocation games offer a feasible distributed resource management alternative for autonomic/self-organizing systems, in which the adoption of a global optimization approach (centralized or distributed) would be neither practical nor justifiable.

Angels: In Network Support for Minimum Distribution Time in P2P Overlays

This paper proposes the use of in-network caches (which we call Angels) to reduce the Minimum Distribution Time (MDT) of a file from a seeder – a node that possesses the file – to a set of leechers – nodes who are interested in downloading the file. An Angel is not a leecher in the sense that it is not interested in receiving the entire file, but rather it is interested in minimizing the MDT to all leechers, and as such uses its storage and up/down-link capacity to cache and forward parts of the file to other peers. We extend the analytical results by Kumar and Ross [1] to account for the presence of angels by deriving a new lower bound for the MDT. We show that this newly derived lower bound is tight by proposing a distribution strategy under assumptions of a fluid model. We present a GroupTree heuristic that addresses the impracticalities of the fluid model. We evaluate our designs through simulations that show that our Group-Tree heuristic outperforms other heuristics, that it scales well with the increase of the number of leechers, and that it closely approaches the optimal theoretical bounds.

Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.

Angels: In-Network Support for Minimum Distribution Time in P2P Overlays

This thesis proposes the use of in-network caches (which we call Angels) to reduce the Minimum Distribution Time (MDT) of a file from a seeder – a node that possesses the file – to a set of leechers – nodes who are interested in downloading the file. An Angel is not a leecher in the sense that it is not interested in receiving the entire file, but rather it is interested in minimizing the MDT to all leechers, and as such uses its storage and up/down-link capacity to cache and forward parts of the file to other peers. We extend the analytical results by Kumar and Ross (Kumar and Ross, 2006) to account for the presence of angels by deriving a new lower bound for the MDT. We show that this newly derived lower bound is tight by proposing a distribution strategy under assumptions of a fluid model. We present a GroupTree heuristic that addresses the impracticalities of the fluid model. We evaluate our designs through simulations that show that our GroupTree heuristic outperforms other heuristics, that it scales well with the increase of the number of leechers, and that it closely approaches the optimal theoretical bounds.

A Neural Network Model for the Spatial and Temporal Response of Retinal Ganglion Cells

This article introduces a quantitative model of early visual system function. The model is formulated to unify analyses of spatial and temporal information processing by the nervous system. Functional constraints of the model suggest mechanisms analogous to photoreceptors, bipolar cells, and retinal ganglion cells, which can be formally represented with first order differential equations. Preliminary numerical simulations and analytical results show that the same formal mechanisms can explain the behavior of both X (linear) and Y (nonlinear) retinal ganglion cell classes by simple changes in the relative width of the receptive field (RF) center and surround mechanisms. Specifically, an increase in the width of the RF center results in a change from X-like to Y-like response, in agreement with anatomical data on the relationship between α- and