On the Geographic Location of Internet Resources

One relatively unexplored question about the Internet's physical structure concerns the geographical location of its components: routers, links and autonomous systems (ASes). We study this question using two large inventories of Internet routers and links, collected by different methods and about two years apart. We first map each router to its geographical location using two different state-of-the-art tools. We then study the relationship between router location and population density; between geographic distance and link density; and between the size and geographic extent of ASes. Our findings are consistent across the two datasets and both mapping methods. First, as expected, router density per person varies widely over different economic regions; however, in economically homogeneous regions, router density shows a strong superlinear relationship to population density. Second, the probability that two routers are directly connected is strongly dependent on distance; our data is consistent with a model in which a majority (up to 75-95%) of link formation is based on geographical distance (as in the Waxman topology generation method). Finally, we find that ASes show high variability in geographic size, which is correlated with other measures of AS size (degree and number of interfaces). Among small to medium ASes, ASes show wide variability in their geographic dispersal; however, all ASes exceeding a certain threshold in size are maximally dispersed geographically. These findings have many implications for the next generation of topology generators, which we envisage as producing router-level graphs annotated with attributes such as link latencies, AS identifiers and geographical locations.

"Networking is IPC": A Guiding Principle to a Better Internet

This position paper outlines a new network architecture, i.e., a style of construction that identifies the objects and how they relate. We do not specify particular protocol implementations or specific interfaces and policies. After all, it should be possible to change protocols in an architecture without changing the architecture. Rather we outline the repeating patterns and structures, and how the proposed model would cope with the challenges faced by today's Internet (and that of the future). Our new architecture is based on the following principle: Application processes communicate via a distributed inter-process communication (IPC) facility. The application processes that make up this facility provide a protocol that implements an IPC mechanism, and a protocol for managing distributed IPC (routing, security and other management tasks). Existing implementation strategies, algorithms, and protocols can be cast and used within our proposed new structure.

Assessing the Security of a Clean-Slate Internet Architecture

The TCP/IP architecture was originally designed without taking security measures into consideration. Over the years, it has been subjected to many attacks, which has led to many patches to counter them. Our investigations into the fundamental principles of networking have shown that carefully following an abstract model of Interprocess Communication (IPC) addresses many problems [1]. Guided by this IPC principle, we designed a clean-slate Recursive INternet Architecture (RINA) [2]. In this paper, we show how, without the aid of cryptographic techniques, the bare-bones architecture of RINA can resist most of the security attacks faced by TCP/IP. We also show how hard it is for an intruder to compromise RINA. Then, we show how RINA inherently supports security policies in a more manageable, on-demand basis, in contrast to the rigid, piecemeal approach of TCP/IP.

On the Origin of Power Laws in Internet Topologies

Recent empirical studies have shown that Internet topologies exhibit power laws of the form for the following relationships: (P1) outdegree of node (domain or router) versus rank; (P2) number of nodes versus outdegree; (P3) number of node pairs y = x^α within a neighborhood versus neighborhood size (in hops); and (P4) eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix versus rank. However, causes for the appearance of such power laws have not been convincingly given. In this paper, we examine four factors in the formation of Internet topologies. These factors are (F1) preferential connectivity of a new node to existing nodes; (F2) incremental growth of the network; (F3) distribution of nodes in space; and (F4) locality of edge connections. In synthetically generated network topologies, we study the relevance of each factor in causing the aforementioned power laws as well as other properties, namely diameter, average path length and clustering coefficient. Different kinds of network topologies are generated: (T1) topologies generated using our parametrized generator, we call BRITE; (T2) random topologies generated using the well-known Waxman model; (T3) Transit-Stub topologies generated using GT-ITM tool; and (T4) regular grid topologies. We observe that some generated topologies may not obey power laws P1 and P2. Thus, the existence of these power laws can be used to validate the accuracy of a given tool in generating representative Internet topologies. Power laws P3 and P4 were observed in nearly all considered topologies, but different topologies showed different values of the power exponent α. Thus, while the presence of power laws P3 and P4 do not give strong evidence for the representativeness of a generated topology, the value of α in P3 and P4 can be used as a litmus test for the representativeness of a generated topology. We also find that factors F1 and F2 are the key contributors in our study which provide the resemblance of our generated topologies to that of the Internet.

QoS Controllers for the Internet

In this position paper, we review basic control strategies that machines acting as "traffic controllers" could deploy in order to improve the management of Internet services. Such traffic controllers are likely to spur the widespread emergence of advanced applications, which have (so far) been hindered by the inability of the networking infrastructure to deliver on the promise of Quality-of-Service (QoS).