Information Security as Exemplified by Clandestine Collaboration and Influence Exerted by the Polish Internal Security Agency Officers on Journalists - De Lege Lata and De Lege Ferenda Regulations

The text addresses the issue of information security as exemplified by clandestine collaboration and the influence exerted by the Internal Security Agency officers upon journalists. The texts analyzes the de lege lata regulations as well as the de lege ferenda ones. As for the former, the penal provisions of the Act, that is Articles 153b–153d (Chapter 10a) are applicable, whereas as for the latter, the applicable regulations are the 2013 Bill Articles numbered 197-199 (Chapter 10). In both the 2002 Act on the Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency as well as in the 2013 draft Bill of the Internal Security Agency, the legislator penalizes the employment by the officers of the information acquired while fulfilling or in connection with official duties for the purpose of affecting the operation of public authority bodies, entrepreneurs or broadcasters, editors-in-chief, journalists and persons conducting publishing activity. Also, the text analyzes regulations concerned with the penalization of clandestine collaboration engaged in by ABW officers with a broadcaster, editor-in-chief, a journalist and a person conducting publishing activity.

Surveillance and data retention in Poland

The object of analysis in the present text is the issue of operational control and data retention in Poland. The analysis of this issue follows from a critical stance taken by NGOs and state institutions on the scope of operational control wielded by the Polish police and special services – it concerns, in particular, the employment of “itemized phone bills and the so-called phone tapping.” Besides the quantitative analysis of operational control and the scope of data retention, the text features the conclusions of the Human Rights Defender referred to the Constitutional Tribunal in 2011. It must be noted that the main problems concerned with the employment of operational control and data retention are caused by: (1) a lack of specification of technical means which can be used by individual services; (2) a lack of specification of what kind of information and evidence is in question; (3) an open catalogue of information and evidence which can be clandestinely acquired in an operational mode. Furthermore, with regard to the access granted to teleinformation data by the Telecommunications Act, attention should be drawn to a wide array of data submitted to particular services. Also, the text draws on the so-called open interviews conducted mainly with former police officers with a view to pointing to some non-formal reasons for “phone tapping” in Poland. This comes in the form of a summary.