Accents of Chopin anniversaries in territories annexed by Prussia

This article discusses the way in which the Chopin Year of 1910 was celebrated in Wielkopolska. It presents a script prepared in the nineteenth century and shows similarities with celebrations of Mickiewicz and other Polish heroes and artists. Invariably used in such commemorations was a “symbolic capital” that made it easier to create an intergenerational code, thereby disseminating knowledge of national culture and history. A significant role was played in 1910 by a centenary panel, which produced “Guidelines for popular Chopin celebrations” and also many occasional, popular materials. Chopin’s induction into the national pantheon involved the use of audio material (vocal and instrumental concerts), verbal material (articles, poems, lectures and brochures) and also a visual code (anniversary window stickers, tableaux vivants or tableaux illuminés). Illuminated pictures – recommended by a catalogue of slides produced in Poznań – stimulated the imagination of the masses and served as a guide through the composer’s life and work, and their impact was enhanced by a commentary. Most of the living pictures were probably inspired by Henryk Siemiradzki’s canvas Chopin grający na fortepianie w salonie księcia Radziwiłła [Chopin playing the piano in Prince Radziwiłł’s salon] and Józef Męcina Krzesz’s painting Ostatnie akordy Chopina [Chopin’s last chords]. This combination of codes made it possible to create a model adapted to the times and to the expectations of a mass audience. The Chopin anniversary, in which admiration was inseparably intertwined with manipulation, was a pretext for strengthening the national identity.

Filozofia antyczna wobec problemu interpretacji. Rozwój alegorezy od przedsokratyków do Arystotelesa

The present work examines the beginnings of ancient hermeneutics. More specifically, it discusses the connection between the rise of the practice of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the emergence of the first theory of figurative language, on the other. Thus, this book investigates the specific historical and cultural circumstances that enabled the ancient Greeks not only to discover the possibility of allegorical interpretation, but also to treat figurative language as a philosophical problem. By posing difficulties in understanding the enigmatic sense of various esoteric doctrines, poems, oracles and riddles, figurative language created the context for theoretical reflection on the meaning of these “messages”. Hence, ancient interpreters began to ponder over the nature and functions of figurative (“enigmatic”) language as well as over the techniques of its proper use and interpretation. Although the practice of allegorical interpretation was closely linked to the development of the whole of ancient philosophy, the present work covers only the period from the 6th to the 4th century B.C. It concentrates, then, on the philosophical and cultural consequences of allegoresis in the classical age. The main thesis advocated here has it that the ancient Greeks were in-clined to regard allegory as a cognitive problem rather than merely as a stylistic or a literary one. When searching for the hidden meanings of various esoteric doc-trines, poems, oracles and riddles, ancient interpreters of these “messages” assumed allegory to be the only tool suitable for articulating certain matters. In other words, it was their belief that the use of figurative language resulted from the necessity of expressing things that were otherwise inexpressible. The present work has been organized in the following manner. The first part contains historical and philological discussions that provide the point of departure for more philosophical considerations. This part consists of two introductory chapters. Chapter one situates the practice of allegorical interpretation at the borderline of two different traditions: the rhetorical-grammatical and the hermeneutical. In order to clearly differentiate between the two, chapter one distinguishes between allegory and allegoresis, on the one hand, and allegoresis and exegesis, on the other. While pointing to the conventionality (and even arbitrariness) of such distinctions, the chapter argues, nevertheless, for their heuristic usefulness. The remaining part of chapter one focuses on a historical and philological reconstruction of the most important conceptual tools of ancient hermeneutics. Discussing the semantics of such terms as allēgoría, hypónoia, ainigma and symbolon proves important for at least two crucial reasons. Firstly, it reveals the mutual affinity between allegoresis and divination, i.e., practices that are inherently connected with the need to discover the latent meaning of the “message” in question (whether poem or oracle). Secondly, these philological analyses bring to light the specificity of the ancient understanding of such concepts as allegory or symbol. It goes without saying that antiquity employed these terms in a manner quite disparate from modernity. Chapter one concludes with a discussion of ancient views on the cognitive value of figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Chapter two focuses on the role that allegoresis played in the process of transforming mythos into logos. It is suggested here that it was the practice of allegorical interpretation that made it possible to preserve the traditional myths as an important point of reference for the whole of ancient philosophy. Thus, chapter two argues that the existence of a clear opposition between mythos into logos in Preplatonic philosophy is highly questionable in light of the indisputable fact that the Presocratics, Sophists and Cynics were profoundly convinced about the cognitive value of mythos (this conviction was also shared by Plato and Aristotle, but their attitude towards myth was more complex). Consequently, chapter two argues that in Preplatonic philosophy, myth played a function analogous to the concepts discussed in chapter one (i.e., hidden meanings, enigmas and symbols), for in all these cases, ancient interpreters found tools for conveying issues that were otherwise difficult to convey. Chapter two concludes with a classification of various types of allegoresis. Whilst chapters one and two serve as a historical and philological introduction, the second part of this book concentrates on the close relationship between the development of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the flowering of philosophy, on the other. Thus, chapter three discusses the crucial role that allegorical interpretation came to play in Preplatonic philosophy, chapter four deals with Plato’s highly complex and ambivalent attitude to allegoresis, and chapter five has been devoted to Aristotle’s original approach to the practice of allegorical interpretation. It is evident that allegoresis was of paramount importance for the ancient thinkers, irrespective of whether they would value it positively (Preplatonic philosophers and Aristotle) or negatively (Plato). Beginning with the 6th century B.C., the ancient practice of allegorical interpretation is motivated by two distinct interests. On the one hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects the more or less “conservative” attachment to the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus). The purpose of this apologetic allegoresis is to exonerate poetry from the charges leveled at it by the first philosophers and, though to a lesser degree, historians. Generally, these allegorists seek to save the traditional paideia that builds on the works of the poets. On the other hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects also the more or less “progressive” desire to make original use of the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus) so as to promote a given philosophical doctrine. The objective of this instrumental allegoresis is to exculpate philosophy from the accusations brought against it by the more conservative circles. Needless to say, these allegorists significantly contribute to the process of the gradual replacing of the mythical view of the world with its more philosophical explanation. The present book suggests that it is the philosophy of Aristotle that should be regarded as a sort of acme in the development of ancient hermeneutics. The reasons for this are twofold. On the one hand, the Stagirite positively values the practice of allegoresis, rehabilitating, thus, the tradition of Preplatonic philosophy against Plato. And, on the other hand, Aristotle initiates the theoretical reflection on figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Hence, in Aristotle we encounter not only the practice of allegoresis, but also the theory of allegory (although the philosopher does not use the term allēgoría). With the situation being as it is, the significance of Aristotle’s work cannot be overestimated. First of all, the Stagirite introduces the concept of metaphor into the then philosophical considerations. From that moment onwards, the phenomenon of figurative language becomes an important philosophical issue. After Aristo-tle, the preponderance of thinkers would feel obliged to specify the rules for the appropriate use of figurative language and the techniques of its correct interpretation. Furthermore, Aristotle ascribes to metaphor (and to various other “excellent” sayings) the function of increasing and enhancing our knowledge. Thus, according to the Stagirite, figurative language is not only an ornamental device, but it can also have a significant explanatory power. Finally, Aristotle observes that figurative expressions cause words to become ambiguous. In this context, the philosopher notices that ambiguity can enrich the language of a poet, but it can also hinder a dialectical discussion. Accordingly, Aristotle is inclined to value polysemy either positively or negatively. Importantly, however, the Stagirite is perfectly aware of the fact that in natural languages ambiguity is unavoidable. This is why Aristotle initiates a syste-matic reflection on the phenomenon of ambiguity and distinguishes its various kinds. In Aristotle, ambiguity is, then, both a problem that needs to be identified and a tool that can help in elucidating intricate philosophical issues. This unique approach to ambiguity and figurative (“enigmatic”) language enabled Aristotle to formulate invaluable intuitions that still await appropriate recognition.

W stronę uniwersytetu jako instytucji dobra wspólnego. Filozoficzne podstawy krytycznych badań nad szkolnictwem wyższym

Wydział Nauk Społecznych: Instytut Filozofii

Constructing Universities as Organizations: University Reforms in Poland in the Light of Institutional Theory

This chapter shows that apart from changes at the systemic and institutional levels, successful reform implementation struggles with a gradual change in academic beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. Currently, visions of the university proposed by the Polish academic community and visions of it proposed by Polish reformers and policymakers (within ongoing reforms) are worlds apart. I shall study recent reforms in the context of specific academic self--protective narratives being produced in the last two decades (at the collective level of the academic profession) and in the context of the Ivory Tower university ideals predominant at the individual level (as studied comparatively through a large--scale European survey of the academic profession). Institutions change both swiftly, radically – and slowly, gradually. Research literature on institutional change until recently was focused almost exclusively on the role of radical changes caused by external shocks, leading to radical institutional reconfigurations. And research literature about the gradual, incremental institutional change have been emergent for about a decade and a half now (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck and Thelen 2005, 2009; Thelen 2003). Polish higher education provides interesting empirical grounds to test institutional theories. Both types of transformations (radical and gradual) may lead to equally permanent changes in the functioning of institutions, equally deep transformations of their fundamental rules, norms and operating procedures. Questions about institutional change are questions about characteristics of institutions undergoing changes. Endogenous institutional change is as important as exogenous change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 3). Moments in which there emerge opportunities of performing deep institutional reforms are short (in Poland these moments occurred in 2009-2012), and between them there are long periods of institutional stasis and stability (Pierson 2004: 134-135). The premises of theories of institutional change can be applied systematically to a system of higher education which shows an unprecedented rate of change and which is exposed to broad, fundamental reform programmes. There are many ways to discuss the Kudrycka reforms - and "constructing Polish universities as organizations" (rather than traditional academic "institutions") is one of more promising. In this account, Polish universities are under construction as organizations, and under siege as institutions. They are being rationalized as organizations, following instrumental rather than institutional logics. Polish academics in their views and attitudes are still following an institutional logic, while Polish reforms are following the new (New Public Management-led) instrumental logics. Both are on a collision course about basic values. Reforms and reformees seem to be worlds apart. I am discussing the the two contrasting visions of the university and describing the Kudrycka reforms as the reistitutionalization of the research mission of Polish universities. The core of reforms is a new level of funding and governance - the intermediary one (and no longer the state one), with four new peer-run institutions, with the KEJN, PKA and NCN in the lead. Poland has been beginning to follow the "global rules of the academic game" since 2009. I am also discussing two academic self-protection modes agains reforms: (Polish) "national academic traditions" and "institutional exceptionalism" (of Polish HE). Both discourses prevailed for two decades, none seems socially (and politically) acceptable any more. Old myths do not seem to fit new realities. In this context I am discussing briefly and through large-scale empirical data the low connectedness to the outside world of Polish HE institutions, low influence of the government on HE policies and the low level of academic entrepreneurialism, as seen through the EUROAC/CAP micro-level data. The conclusion is that the Kudrycka reforms are an imporant first step only - Poland is too slow in reforms, and reforms are both underfunded and inconsistent. Poland is still accumulating disadvantages as public funding and university reforms have not reached a critical point. Ever more efforts lead to ever less results, as macro-level data show. Consequently, it may be useful to construct universities as organizations in Poland to a higher degree than elsewhere in Europe, and especially in Western Europe.