W oczekiwaniu na Paruzję. Myśl eschatologiczna w prawosławnym piśmiennictwie słowiańskim do początku XVI wieku

Wydział Filologii Polskiej i Klasycznej: Instytut Filologii Słowiańskiej

Optymalizacja metod analizy Főrsterowskiego rezonansowego przeniesienia energii (FRET) pojedynczych cząsteczek

Wydział Chemii: Zakład Chemii Fizycznej

Federacja Rosyjska po wyborach do Dumy Państwowej 2007 r.

Wybory do Dumy Państwowej z 2007 r. nie zmieniły układu sił politycznych. Skład parlamentu pozostał prawie takim, jaki był przed wyborami. Jednak wyniki były dość ważne jako świadectwo stabilizacji systemu politycznego: kompozycja sił politycznych pozostała niezmieniona. Znaczenie Dumy, powołanej w toku wyborów z grudnia 2007 r., prawdopodobnie będzie słabło. Parlament stał się jeszcze mniej samodzielny, jeszcze bardziej posłuszny wobec władzy wykonawczej. Można nawet pokusić się o stwierdzenie, że Duma rosyjska coraz to bardziej przypomina Radę Naczelną ZSRR do roku 1989.

Badania archeologiczne a obrazowanie wizualne przeszłości

One can say that our times are dominated by visual communication. Usually all day long we have been faced by various pictures, visual forms and symbols. According to the subject of the book 'Archaeology-Culture-Ideologies' I found it interesting to pay attention to the problem of visual representation, or better say visual symbols in nowadays communication and culture, their meaning and importance. From this point of view I would like to show the role of archaeologists who discover, interpret or even create some of them. The subject is not new of course, but the most often it is taken into consideration by the scholars who practice in social anthropology or philosophy and quite rarely it appear in studies of archaeologies, especially in Polish tradition. In my opinion the subject concerning visual symbols communication and archaeology arise several important questions that are also valid for the theme of book 'Archaeology-Culture-Ideologies'. The first is socio-cultural role of our discipline, next the danger of political and propaganda misuse of the results of archaeological research and then also commercialisation of the archaeological activities. The problem of visualisation and visual-communication can be the matter of various studies. In my paper from the beginning I would like to present the general view concerning visual symbols and figural motifs and the main ideas and approaches to study them from different humanistic perspectives. Then in my presentation I am going to discuss the question why in our culture the visual symbols and representations became so popular – compare to other ways of human expression, for example verbal symbol communication. I would like to see the problem in historical perspective as well. There are a lot of evidences, which support the statement about the power of visual symbols in history. In ancient times for example Horace in 'Ars Poetica' suggested that human mind usually is much more impressed by eyes than by ears. In my opinion that is quite often in human culture that visual impression is before mental one. Visual representations and symbols are very powerful, they can show and communicate various phenomena, they act immediately and quite often in easily way they can associate. So for archaeological research it could be very important to make some studies concerning the ancient symbols and general iconography and also it would be grateful to make some attempts for the study what kind of potential meaning could have visual symbols. In my paper I can only make some general statement about it. But the most important for the topic is reflection on prehistoric and ancient visual symbols and representation and their presence in contemporary culture. So after some general statements concerning the visual symbols examined from various perspectives finally I would like to point out with support of some examples how ancient and prehistoric visual symbols and images are still used and captured by contemporary culture and what is or should be the role of archaeologists activity concerning this matter.

Filozofia antyczna wobec problemu interpretacji. Rozwój alegorezy od przedsokratyków do Arystotelesa

The present work examines the beginnings of ancient hermeneutics. More specifically, it discusses the connection between the rise of the practice of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the emergence of the first theory of figurative language, on the other. Thus, this book investigates the specific historical and cultural circumstances that enabled the ancient Greeks not only to discover the possibility of allegorical interpretation, but also to treat figurative language as a philosophical problem. By posing difficulties in understanding the enigmatic sense of various esoteric doctrines, poems, oracles and riddles, figurative language created the context for theoretical reflection on the meaning of these “messages”. Hence, ancient interpreters began to ponder over the nature and functions of figurative (“enigmatic”) language as well as over the techniques of its proper use and interpretation. Although the practice of allegorical interpretation was closely linked to the development of the whole of ancient philosophy, the present work covers only the period from the 6th to the 4th century B.C. It concentrates, then, on the philosophical and cultural consequences of allegoresis in the classical age. The main thesis advocated here has it that the ancient Greeks were in-clined to regard allegory as a cognitive problem rather than merely as a stylistic or a literary one. When searching for the hidden meanings of various esoteric doc-trines, poems, oracles and riddles, ancient interpreters of these “messages” assumed allegory to be the only tool suitable for articulating certain matters. In other words, it was their belief that the use of figurative language resulted from the necessity of expressing things that were otherwise inexpressible. The present work has been organized in the following manner. The first part contains historical and philological discussions that provide the point of departure for more philosophical considerations. This part consists of two introductory chapters. Chapter one situates the practice of allegorical interpretation at the borderline of two different traditions: the rhetorical-grammatical and the hermeneutical. In order to clearly differentiate between the two, chapter one distinguishes between allegory and allegoresis, on the one hand, and allegoresis and exegesis, on the other. While pointing to the conventionality (and even arbitrariness) of such distinctions, the chapter argues, nevertheless, for their heuristic usefulness. The remaining part of chapter one focuses on a historical and philological reconstruction of the most important conceptual tools of ancient hermeneutics. Discussing the semantics of such terms as allēgoría, hypónoia, ainigma and symbolon proves important for at least two crucial reasons. Firstly, it reveals the mutual affinity between allegoresis and divination, i.e., practices that are inherently connected with the need to discover the latent meaning of the “message” in question (whether poem or oracle). Secondly, these philological analyses bring to light the specificity of the ancient understanding of such concepts as allegory or symbol. It goes without saying that antiquity employed these terms in a manner quite disparate from modernity. Chapter one concludes with a discussion of ancient views on the cognitive value of figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Chapter two focuses on the role that allegoresis played in the process of transforming mythos into logos. It is suggested here that it was the practice of allegorical interpretation that made it possible to preserve the traditional myths as an important point of reference for the whole of ancient philosophy. Thus, chapter two argues that the existence of a clear opposition between mythos into logos in Preplatonic philosophy is highly questionable in light of the indisputable fact that the Presocratics, Sophists and Cynics were profoundly convinced about the cognitive value of mythos (this conviction was also shared by Plato and Aristotle, but their attitude towards myth was more complex). Consequently, chapter two argues that in Preplatonic philosophy, myth played a function analogous to the concepts discussed in chapter one (i.e., hidden meanings, enigmas and symbols), for in all these cases, ancient interpreters found tools for conveying issues that were otherwise difficult to convey. Chapter two concludes with a classification of various types of allegoresis. Whilst chapters one and two serve as a historical and philological introduction, the second part of this book concentrates on the close relationship between the development of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the flowering of philosophy, on the other. Thus, chapter three discusses the crucial role that allegorical interpretation came to play in Preplatonic philosophy, chapter four deals with Plato’s highly complex and ambivalent attitude to allegoresis, and chapter five has been devoted to Aristotle’s original approach to the practice of allegorical interpretation. It is evident that allegoresis was of paramount importance for the ancient thinkers, irrespective of whether they would value it positively (Preplatonic philosophers and Aristotle) or negatively (Plato). Beginning with the 6th century B.C., the ancient practice of allegorical interpretation is motivated by two distinct interests. On the one hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects the more or less “conservative” attachment to the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus). The purpose of this apologetic allegoresis is to exonerate poetry from the charges leveled at it by the first philosophers and, though to a lesser degree, historians. Generally, these allegorists seek to save the traditional paideia that builds on the works of the poets. On the other hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects also the more or less “progressive” desire to make original use of the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus) so as to promote a given philosophical doctrine. The objective of this instrumental allegoresis is to exculpate philosophy from the accusations brought against it by the more conservative circles. Needless to say, these allegorists significantly contribute to the process of the gradual replacing of the mythical view of the world with its more philosophical explanation. The present book suggests that it is the philosophy of Aristotle that should be regarded as a sort of acme in the development of ancient hermeneutics. The reasons for this are twofold. On the one hand, the Stagirite positively values the practice of allegoresis, rehabilitating, thus, the tradition of Preplatonic philosophy against Plato. And, on the other hand, Aristotle initiates the theoretical reflection on figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Hence, in Aristotle we encounter not only the practice of allegoresis, but also the theory of allegory (although the philosopher does not use the term allēgoría). With the situation being as it is, the significance of Aristotle’s work cannot be overestimated. First of all, the Stagirite introduces the concept of metaphor into the then philosophical considerations. From that moment onwards, the phenomenon of figurative language becomes an important philosophical issue. After Aristo-tle, the preponderance of thinkers would feel obliged to specify the rules for the appropriate use of figurative language and the techniques of its correct interpretation. Furthermore, Aristotle ascribes to metaphor (and to various other “excellent” sayings) the function of increasing and enhancing our knowledge. Thus, according to the Stagirite, figurative language is not only an ornamental device, but it can also have a significant explanatory power. Finally, Aristotle observes that figurative expressions cause words to become ambiguous. In this context, the philosopher notices that ambiguity can enrich the language of a poet, but it can also hinder a dialectical discussion. Accordingly, Aristotle is inclined to value polysemy either positively or negatively. Importantly, however, the Stagirite is perfectly aware of the fact that in natural languages ambiguity is unavoidable. This is why Aristotle initiates a syste-matic reflection on the phenomenon of ambiguity and distinguishes its various kinds. In Aristotle, ambiguity is, then, both a problem that needs to be identified and a tool that can help in elucidating intricate philosophical issues. This unique approach to ambiguity and figurative (“enigmatic”) language enabled Aristotle to formulate invaluable intuitions that still await appropriate recognition.

Rorty's Elective Affinities. The New Pragmatism and Postmodern Thought

The present book is devoted to "European connections of Richard Rorty's neopragmatism". The theme, chosen carefully and intentionally, is supposed to show the motivation behind the writing of the present work, as well as to show its intended extent. Let us consider briefly the first three parts of the theme, to enlighten a little our intentions. "European" is perhaps the most important description for it was precisely that thread that was most important to me, being the only context seriously taken into account, as I assumed right from the start that I would not be writing about rather more widely unknown to me - and much less fascinating (even to Rorty, the hero of the story) from my own, traditional, Continental philosophical perspective - American analytic philosophy. So accordingly I have almost totally skipped "American" connections (to use the distinction I need here) of Rorty's philosophy, that is to say, firstly, a years-long work within analytic philosophy, secondly struggles with it on its own grounds, and finally attempts to use classical American, mainly Deweyan, pragmatism for his own needs and numerous polemics associated with it - the questions that are far away from my interests and that arise limited interest among reading and writing philosophical audience in Poland, and perhaps also among Continental philosophers. It did not seem possible to me to write a book on Rorty in his American connections for they are insufficiently known to me, demanding knowledge of both post-war American analytic philosophy as well as pragmatism of its father-founders. I could see, setting to work on Richard Rorty, that a book on his American connections (leaving aside the issue that it would not be a philosophical problem but rather, let us say, the one of writing a monograph) written by a Polish philosopher in Poland and then in the USA was not a stimulating intellectual challenge but rather a thankless working task. Besides, having spent much time on Rorty's philosophy, writing extensively about him and translating his works, I already knew that the "Continental" context was extremely important to his neopragmatism, and that thinking about it could be relatively prolific (as opposed to the context potentially given by American philosophy).

O naruszaniu podstawowych zasad postępowania naukowego. “Wzgórze przeznaczenia archeologii” górą skandalu

„We are paying a high price for the increasingly unequivocal equation drawn between knowledge and science and ordinary market product. The ideal of perfectly unrestrained cognition, the true mother of science, is threatened by the mass drive towards practical use and application of knowledge, a looming departure into nothingness. Politicians and managers of scientific life are guilty of considerable contribution in corrupting respectable university structures, and thus undermining culture of science and scholarly ethics. (…). Acquisition of funds, sponsorship, media presence, popularisation or even striving for commercial gain are recognised by politicians and scientific consultants, but most of all they are accepted by the university management as objectives worthy of effort, not to say the foremost goals of science. University rectors are nowadays interested primarily in the amounts of acquired moneys. The outcomes of research thus financed is subject to virtually no control, nor does it arouse any interest, unless it turns out to be fit to be announced in the media as a sensation, thereby serving the ‘prestige’ of the university”.

The ‘Faust’ or ’Lucifer’ Sonata? On Liszt’s idea of programme music as exemplifi ed by his Piano Sonata in B minor

The musicological tradition places Liszt’s Sonata in B minor within the sphere of compositions inspired by the Faustian myth. Its musical material, its structure and its narrative exhibit certain similarities to the ‘Faust’ Symphony. Yet there has appeared a diff erent and, one may say, a rival interpretation of Sonata in B minor. What is more, it is well-documented from both a musical and a historical point of view. It has been presented by Hungarian pianist and musicologist Tibor Szász. He proposes the thesis that the Sonata in B minor has been in fact inspired by Milton’s Paradise Lost, with its three protagonists: Adam, Satan and Christ. He fi nds their illustrations and even some key elements of the plot in the Sonata’s narrative. But yet Milton’s Paradise Lost and Goethe’s Faust are both stories of the Fall and Salvation, of the cosmic struggle between good and evil. The triads of their protagonists – Adam and Eve, Satan, and Christ; Faust, Mephisto and Gretchen – are homological. Thus both interpretations of the Sonata, the Goethean and the Miltonian, or, in other words, the Faustian and the Luciferian, are parallel and complementary rather than rival. It is also highly probable that both have had their impact on the genesis of the Sonata in B minor.