Exploitation of linguistic ambiguity in Polish and English jokes

English & Polish jokes based on linguistic ambiguity are constrasted. Linguistic ambiguity results from a multiplicity of semantic interpretations motivated by structural pattern. The meanings can be "translated" either by variations of the corresponding minimal strings or by specifying the type & extent of modification needed between the two interpretations. C. F. Hockett's (1972) translatability notion that a joke is linguistic if it cannot readily be translated into other languages without losing its humor is used to interpret some cross-linguistic jokes. It is claimed that additional intralinguistic criteria are needed to classify jokes. By using a syntactic representation, the humor can be explained & compared cross-linguistically. Since the mapping of semantic values onto lexical units is highly language specific, translatability is much less frequent with lexical ambiguity. Similarly, phonological jokes are not usually translatable. Pragmatic ambiguity can be translated on the basis of H. P. Grice's (1975) cooperative principle of conversation that calls for discourse interpretations. If the distinction between linguistic & nonlinguistic jokes is based on translatability, pragmatic jokes must be excluded from the classification. Because of their universality, pragmatic jokes should be included into the linguistic classification by going beyond the translatability criteria & using intralinguistic features to describe them.

Wykorzystanie Gramatyki Kognitywnej w klasie językowej: Nauczanie angielskich konstrukcji dzierżawczych, czasu i aspektu

Wydział Neofilologii: Instytut Filologii Angielskiej

Rorty's Elective Affinities. The New Pragmatism and Postmodern Thought

The present book is devoted to "European connections of Richard Rorty's neopragmatism". The theme, chosen carefully and intentionally, is supposed to show the motivation behind the writing of the present work, as well as to show its intended extent. Let us consider briefly the first three parts of the theme, to enlighten a little our intentions. "European" is perhaps the most important description for it was precisely that thread that was most important to me, being the only context seriously taken into account, as I assumed right from the start that I would not be writing about rather more widely unknown to me - and much less fascinating (even to Rorty, the hero of the story) from my own, traditional, Continental philosophical perspective - American analytic philosophy. So accordingly I have almost totally skipped "American" connections (to use the distinction I need here) of Rorty's philosophy, that is to say, firstly, a years-long work within analytic philosophy, secondly struggles with it on its own grounds, and finally attempts to use classical American, mainly Deweyan, pragmatism for his own needs and numerous polemics associated with it - the questions that are far away from my interests and that arise limited interest among reading and writing philosophical audience in Poland, and perhaps also among Continental philosophers. It did not seem possible to me to write a book on Rorty in his American connections for they are insufficiently known to me, demanding knowledge of both post-war American analytic philosophy as well as pragmatism of its father-founders. I could see, setting to work on Richard Rorty, that a book on his American connections (leaving aside the issue that it would not be a philosophical problem but rather, let us say, the one of writing a monograph) written by a Polish philosopher in Poland and then in the USA was not a stimulating intellectual challenge but rather a thankless working task. Besides, having spent much time on Rorty's philosophy, writing extensively about him and translating his works, I already knew that the "Continental" context was extremely important to his neopragmatism, and that thinking about it could be relatively prolific (as opposed to the context potentially given by American philosophy).

Zasada racji dostatecznej w kontekście semantycznej kontrowersji realizm–antyrealizm

"Principle of sufficient reason in the context of the realism-antirealism semantic controversy". The topic of this article is the cognitive and semantic status of Michael Dummett’s principle C. According to the principle, if a statement is true, there must be something in virtue of which it is true. The author suggests the interpretation of principle C in terms of the sufficient reason principle as a contemporary, weaker and semantic counterpart of the classical version of the principle. Considerations include such problems as: the distinction between the reason-consequence relationship and cause-effect relationship; the reductionism and justificationism in the context of the realism-antirealism semantic controversy; the reversibility of reason-consequence relationship and the question of a search for ultimate reasons. The author also distinguishes three forms of the sufficient reason principle: metaphysical, ontological and propositional.