ΑΝΑΛΥΣΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΣΧΗΜΑΤΑ. Restoring Aristotle’s Lost Diagrams of the Syllogistic Figures

The article examines the relevance of Aristotle’s analysis that concerns the syllogistic figures. On the assumption that Aristotle’s analytics was inspired by the method of geometric analysis, we show how Aristotle used the three terms (letters), when he formulated the three syllogistic figures. So far it has not been appropriately recognized that the three terms — the major, the middle and the minor one — were viewed by Aristotle syntactically and predicatively in the form of diagrams. Many scholars have misunderstood Aristotle in that in the second and third figure the middle term is outside and that in the second figure the major term is next to the middle one, whereas in the third figure it is further from it. By means of diagrams, we have elucidated how this perfectly accords with Aristotle's planar and graphic arrangement. In the light of these diagrams, one can appropriately capture the definition of syllogism as a predicative set of terms. Irrespective of the tricky question concerning the abbreviations that Aristotle himself used with reference to these types of predication, the reconstructed figures allow us better to comprehend the reductions of syllogism to the first figure. We assume that the figures of syllogism are analogous to the figures of categorical predication, i.e., they are specific syntactic and semantic models. Aristotle demanded certain logical and methodological competence within analytics, which reflects his great commitment and contribution to the field.

Widzieć siebie — z czasu minionego ("Tamten" Bolesława Leśmiana i "Kilkunastoletnia" Wisławy Szymborskiej)

The article presents a juxtaposition of the following two brilliant poems "Tamten" (from the collection of poems entitled "Napój cienisty", 1936) and "Kilkunastoletnia" (from the collection of poems entitled "Tutaj", 2009) that employ the same idea of an encounter with oneself – an adolescent person (in the former poem) and a teenage girl (in the latter). The poems exceed the literary convention of just a lyrical reminiscence of the past, they rather form a particular dialogue with the narrator as he/she was years ago, or even propose a kind of a confrontation. Both poems indirectly feature reflections on the passing time and on the author's identity. The poem written by Leśmian fits perfectly into his poetical system, both in terms of the introduction of metaphysical threads and the application of the elements of a love poem and in terms of the plot outline, somewhat reminiscent of his ballads. Szymborska's poem also concurs with her own poetics mostly due to the characteristic subtle auto-irony.

(O)znaki śmierci w polskiej poezji po roku 1956

Wydział Filologii Polskiej i Klasycznej: Instytut Filologii Polskiej

Zrození autobiografického subjektu. Máchův intimní deník a moderní básnické deníky ve vztahu k romantické ideji subjektivismu

My text is an attempt to apply Charles Taylor’s theory, dealing with the origins of the modern self, to Czech autobiographical literature originating in Romanticism. Taking a cue from Jean Starobinski and Philippe Lejeune’s concepts of modern autobiography, I analyse Karel Hynek Mácha’s personal diary from 1835 and try to find and emphasize its narrative and compositional aspects, which anticipate the poetics of modern poetic diaries.

Z recepcji Retoryki Arystotelesa w Bizancjum

The paper deals with the reception of Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric (Rhet. I 1355b26–27) in several Byzantine commentators of Hermogenes’ and Aphthonius’ treatises. A justification of critical interpretation of this definition is to be found in the commentaries of Troilus and Athanasius (4th/5th century) as well as Sopatros (6th century) and Doxapatres (11th century), Maximus Planudes (13th/14th century) and several anonymous commentators. The Byzantine tradition has found Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric to be all too theoretical and insufficiently connected to practical activity, which Byzantium identified with political life.

„Wyłanianie” się podmiotu w autopojetycznie pojmowanej szkole

Istotą artykułu jest dookreślenia podmiotowości w systemie autopojetycznym, jakim może być szkoła. Na początku postaramy się dookreślić znaczenie rozumienia podmiotu i podmiotowości. Przy czym, poszukując ich źródłowych odniesień odwołamy się do myśli Arystotelesa i Kartezjusza, by następnie poddać je krytyce jako niespełnionych oczekiwań nowożytnej i współczesnej cywilizacji. Jednak, powołując się dalej na poglądy M. Heideggera w tym temacie, okazuje się, że podmiot może być traktowany zgoła inaczej niż opisuje to literatura przedmiotu. Przybliżając zatem inne ujęcie podmiotu, postaramy się wykazać, że wyłania się on na styku jego związku z osobowością, co sugeruje, że to właśnie kształcenie i kształtowanie powinno być traktowane jako najważniejsza dziedzina ludzkiej wiedzy. Dopełnienie tej tezy będzie zatem wymagało wyjaśnienia takich pojęć, jak: osobowość i praktyka edukacyjna. I skoro zatem praktyka edukacyjna jest tak istotna i dla kształtowania osobowości, i wyłaniania się podmiotu, to w dalszej części naszej wypowiedzi położymy nacisk na zinstytucjonalizowaną formę praktyki edukacyjnej czyli nauczanie klasowo-lekcyjne, traktowane jako układ autopojetyczny. Wyjaśnienie znaczenia tego układu będzie stanowić kolejną fazę toczonych tutaj rozważań, a ich celem będzie obrona poglądu, że to, co zostanie „wniesione” do klas szkolnych w postaci zasobów i reguł na początku każdego roku szkolnego, będzie się przekładać na kształtowanie i kształcenie osobowości, i tym samym na możliwości samodoświadczania „Się” podmiotowości. Ponieważ pogląd ten może budzić pewne zastrzeżenia, toteż powołamy się na pewne rozważania dotyczące istnienia tzw. podmiotu rekonstruującego, a więc takiego, który wpisany jest w sens istnienia np. projekcji filmowej, spektaklu teatralnego, czytanej książki.

Filozofia antyczna wobec problemu interpretacji. Rozwój alegorezy od przedsokratyków do Arystotelesa

The present work examines the beginnings of ancient hermeneutics. More specifically, it discusses the connection between the rise of the practice of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the emergence of the first theory of figurative language, on the other. Thus, this book investigates the specific historical and cultural circumstances that enabled the ancient Greeks not only to discover the possibility of allegorical interpretation, but also to treat figurative language as a philosophical problem. By posing difficulties in understanding the enigmatic sense of various esoteric doctrines, poems, oracles and riddles, figurative language created the context for theoretical reflection on the meaning of these “messages”. Hence, ancient interpreters began to ponder over the nature and functions of figurative (“enigmatic”) language as well as over the techniques of its proper use and interpretation. Although the practice of allegorical interpretation was closely linked to the development of the whole of ancient philosophy, the present work covers only the period from the 6th to the 4th century B.C. It concentrates, then, on the philosophical and cultural consequences of allegoresis in the classical age. The main thesis advocated here has it that the ancient Greeks were in-clined to regard allegory as a cognitive problem rather than merely as a stylistic or a literary one. When searching for the hidden meanings of various esoteric doc-trines, poems, oracles and riddles, ancient interpreters of these “messages” assumed allegory to be the only tool suitable for articulating certain matters. In other words, it was their belief that the use of figurative language resulted from the necessity of expressing things that were otherwise inexpressible. The present work has been organized in the following manner. The first part contains historical and philological discussions that provide the point of departure for more philosophical considerations. This part consists of two introductory chapters. Chapter one situates the practice of allegorical interpretation at the borderline of two different traditions: the rhetorical-grammatical and the hermeneutical. In order to clearly differentiate between the two, chapter one distinguishes between allegory and allegoresis, on the one hand, and allegoresis and exegesis, on the other. While pointing to the conventionality (and even arbitrariness) of such distinctions, the chapter argues, nevertheless, for their heuristic usefulness. The remaining part of chapter one focuses on a historical and philological reconstruction of the most important conceptual tools of ancient hermeneutics. Discussing the semantics of such terms as allēgoría, hypónoia, ainigma and symbolon proves important for at least two crucial reasons. Firstly, it reveals the mutual affinity between allegoresis and divination, i.e., practices that are inherently connected with the need to discover the latent meaning of the “message” in question (whether poem or oracle). Secondly, these philological analyses bring to light the specificity of the ancient understanding of such concepts as allegory or symbol. It goes without saying that antiquity employed these terms in a manner quite disparate from modernity. Chapter one concludes with a discussion of ancient views on the cognitive value of figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Chapter two focuses on the role that allegoresis played in the process of transforming mythos into logos. It is suggested here that it was the practice of allegorical interpretation that made it possible to preserve the traditional myths as an important point of reference for the whole of ancient philosophy. Thus, chapter two argues that the existence of a clear opposition between mythos into logos in Preplatonic philosophy is highly questionable in light of the indisputable fact that the Presocratics, Sophists and Cynics were profoundly convinced about the cognitive value of mythos (this conviction was also shared by Plato and Aristotle, but their attitude towards myth was more complex). Consequently, chapter two argues that in Preplatonic philosophy, myth played a function analogous to the concepts discussed in chapter one (i.e., hidden meanings, enigmas and symbols), for in all these cases, ancient interpreters found tools for conveying issues that were otherwise difficult to convey. Chapter two concludes with a classification of various types of allegoresis. Whilst chapters one and two serve as a historical and philological introduction, the second part of this book concentrates on the close relationship between the development of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the flowering of philosophy, on the other. Thus, chapter three discusses the crucial role that allegorical interpretation came to play in Preplatonic philosophy, chapter four deals with Plato’s highly complex and ambivalent attitude to allegoresis, and chapter five has been devoted to Aristotle’s original approach to the practice of allegorical interpretation. It is evident that allegoresis was of paramount importance for the ancient thinkers, irrespective of whether they would value it positively (Preplatonic philosophers and Aristotle) or negatively (Plato). Beginning with the 6th century B.C., the ancient practice of allegorical interpretation is motivated by two distinct interests. On the one hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects the more or less “conservative” attachment to the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus). The purpose of this apologetic allegoresis is to exonerate poetry from the charges leveled at it by the first philosophers and, though to a lesser degree, historians. Generally, these allegorists seek to save the traditional paideia that builds on the works of the poets. On the other hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects also the more or less “progressive” desire to make original use of the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus) so as to promote a given philosophical doctrine. The objective of this instrumental allegoresis is to exculpate philosophy from the accusations brought against it by the more conservative circles. Needless to say, these allegorists significantly contribute to the process of the gradual replacing of the mythical view of the world with its more philosophical explanation. The present book suggests that it is the philosophy of Aristotle that should be regarded as a sort of acme in the development of ancient hermeneutics. The reasons for this are twofold. On the one hand, the Stagirite positively values the practice of allegoresis, rehabilitating, thus, the tradition of Preplatonic philosophy against Plato. And, on the other hand, Aristotle initiates the theoretical reflection on figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Hence, in Aristotle we encounter not only the practice of allegoresis, but also the theory of allegory (although the philosopher does not use the term allēgoría). With the situation being as it is, the significance of Aristotle’s work cannot be overestimated. First of all, the Stagirite introduces the concept of metaphor into the then philosophical considerations. From that moment onwards, the phenomenon of figurative language becomes an important philosophical issue. After Aristo-tle, the preponderance of thinkers would feel obliged to specify the rules for the appropriate use of figurative language and the techniques of its correct interpretation. Furthermore, Aristotle ascribes to metaphor (and to various other “excellent” sayings) the function of increasing and enhancing our knowledge. Thus, according to the Stagirite, figurative language is not only an ornamental device, but it can also have a significant explanatory power. Finally, Aristotle observes that figurative expressions cause words to become ambiguous. In this context, the philosopher notices that ambiguity can enrich the language of a poet, but it can also hinder a dialectical discussion. Accordingly, Aristotle is inclined to value polysemy either positively or negatively. Importantly, however, the Stagirite is perfectly aware of the fact that in natural languages ambiguity is unavoidable. This is why Aristotle initiates a syste-matic reflection on the phenomenon of ambiguity and distinguishes its various kinds. In Aristotle, ambiguity is, then, both a problem that needs to be identified and a tool that can help in elucidating intricate philosophical issues. This unique approach to ambiguity and figurative (“enigmatic”) language enabled Aristotle to formulate invaluable intuitions that still await appropriate recognition.

Form, fi gure, and the experience of time in seven southern composers of the 1950s-60s

After the 1980s it is diffi cult, following stylistic criteria, to draw a map of contemporary academic music. All styles are compossible, and all are practiced. In this context, the geographical entity “South of Italy” does not stand out for a musical identity with special technical-stylistic features. Rather, at a socio-cultural level, the South remains today – in music no less than in all areas where there is a gap between top development and stagnation – a land of emigrants: six out of the seven composers treated (Ivan Fedele, Giuseppe Colardo, Rosario Mirigliano, Giuseppe Soccio, Nicola Cisternino, Biagio Putignano, Paolo Aralla) live in the North of Italy. The positive aspect of this is the affi nity of the South with the transnational and superstructural community of contemporary music, which from European and Western has now become almost global. The composers under consideration belong to the generation of the ‘50s, rooted in the serial and post-serial movements (from which Franco Donatoni, Luciano Berio, Luigi Nono, Salvatore Sciarrino, Giacinto Scelsi, are the principals models, to mention only the Italians), dipped in the general phenomenon of timbrism (particularly spectralism), and acquainted with electronics. They draw from these sources various instruments of compositional technique and aspects of their poetics. In particular these composers, active from the ‘80s, develop new ways of construction of the temporal form of music. They share the goal to establish a new continuity, different from the tonal one but at the same time transcending the serial and post-serial disintegration and fragmentation. The primary means to this end is a new enhancement of the category of fi gure, as a clear and distinct, recognizable aggregate of pitches, intervals, register, durations, timbre, articulation, dynamics, and texture. Each composer elaborates the atonal fi gural material in different ways, emphasizing one aspect or another. For example, Fedele (1953) is a master in the management of form per se, Colardo (1953) in the activation of disturbed harmonic effects, Mirigliano (1950) in the creation of a slight tension from the smallest vibrations of sound, Soccio (1950) in the set up of movement by means of accumulations and discharges of energy, Cisternino (1957) in a Cagean-Scelsian emphasis on sound as such, Putignano (1960) in the suspension of time through the succession and transformation of images, Aralla (1960) in the foundation of form from below, from the concreteness of sound.