Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting

We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Type-weighted Approval Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of weighted votes is elected. The implemented voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types. Using this idea, we also obtain a new characterization of Approval Voting.

The impact of investor sentiment on stock returns in emerging markets. The case of Central European markets

This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Eastern European Economics on July 2015, available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00128775.2015.1079139

The role of investor type in the fee structures of pension plans

The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10693-015-0230-1