Exploring the relationship between impulsivity and decision-making on mobile devices.

Mobile devices offer a common platform for both leisure and work-related tasks but this has resulted in a blurred boundary between home and work. In this paper we explore the security implications of this blurred boundary, both for the worker and the employer. Mobile workers may not always make optimum security-related choices when ‘on the go’ and more impulsive individuals may be particularly affected as they are considered more vulnerable to distraction. In this study we used a task scenario, in which 104 users were asked to choose a wireless network when responding to work demands while out of the office. Eye-tracking data was obtained from a subsample of 40 of these participants in order to explore the effects of impulsivity on attention. Our results suggest that impulsive people are more frequent users of public devices and networks in their day-to-day interactions and are more likely to access their social networks on a regular basis. However they are also likely to make risky decisions when working on-the-go, processing fewer features before making those decisions. These results suggest that those with high impulsivity may make more use of the mobile Internet options for both work and private purposes but they also show attentional behavior patterns that suggest they make less considered security-sensitive decisions. The findings are discussed in terms of designs that might support enhanced deliberation, both in the moment and also in relation to longer term behaviors that would contribute to a better work-life balance.

Islamic corporate financing : does it promote profit and loss sharing?

Islamic financing instruments can be categorised into profit and loss/risk sharing and non-participatory instruments. Although profit and loss sharing instruments such as musharakah are widely accepted as the ideal form of Islamic financing, prior studies suggest that alternative instruments such as murabahah are preferred by Islamic banks. Nevertheless, prior studies did not explore factors that influence the use of Islamic financing among non-financial firms. Our study fills this gap and contributes new knowledge in several ways. First, we find no evidence of widespread use of Islamic financing instruments across non-financial firms. This is because the instruments are mostly used by less profitable firms with higher leverage (i.e., risky firms). Second, we find that profit and loss sharing instruments are hardly used, whilst the use of murabahah is dominant. Consistent with the prediction of moral-hazard-risk avoidance theory, further analysis suggests that users with a lower asset base (to serve as collateral) are associated with murabahah financing. Third, we present a critical discourse on the contentious nature of murabahah as practised. The economic significance and ethical issues associated with murabahah as practised should trigger serious efforts to steer Islamic corporate financing towards risk-sharing more than the controversial rent-seeking practice.