GABAA receptor chloride channels are involved in the neuroprotective role of GABA following oxygen and glucose deprivation in the rat cerebral cortex but not in the hippocampus.

Assays on "ex vivo" sections of rat hippocampus and rat cerebral cortex, subjected to oxygen and glucose deprivation (OGD) and a three-hour reperfusion-like (RL) recovery, were performed in the presence of either GABA or the GABA(A) receptor binding site antagonist, bicuculline. Lactate dehydrogenase (LDH) and propidium iodide were used to quantify cell mortality. We also measured, using real-time quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR), the early transcriptional response of a number of genes of the glutamatergic and GABAergic systems. Specifically, glial pre- and post-synaptic glutamatergic transporters (namely GLAST1a, EAAC-1, GLT-1 and VGLUT1), three GABAA receptor subunits (α1, β2 and γ2), and the GABAergic presynaptic marker, glutamic acid decarboxylase (GAD65), were studied. Mortality assays revealed that GABAA receptor chloride channels play an important role in the neuroprotective effect of GABA in the cerebral cortex, but have a much smaller effect in the hippocampus. We also found that GABA reverses the OGD-dependent decrease in GABA(A) receptor transcript levels, as well as mRNA levels of the membrane and vesicular glutamate transporter genes. Based on the markers used, we conclude that OGD results in differential responses in the GABAergic presynaptic and postsynaptic systems.

It's not interaction, it's make believe.

A principal, but largely unexplored, use of our cognition when using interacting technology involves pretending. To pretend is to believe that which is not the case, for example, when we use the desktop on our personal computer we are pretending, that is, we are pretending that the screen is a desktop upon which windows reside. But, of course, the screen really isn't a desktop. Similarly when we engage in scenario- or persona-based design we are pretending about the settings, narrative, contexts and agents involved. Although there are exceptions, the overwhelming majority of the contents of these different kinds of stories are not the case. We also often pretend when we engage in the evaluation of these technologies (e.g. in the Wizard of Oz technique we "ignore the man behind the curtain"). We are pretending when we ascribe human-like qualities to digital technology. In each we temporarily believe something to be the case which is not. If we add the experience of tele- and social-presence to this, and the diverse experiences which can arise from using digital technology which too are predicted on pretending, then we are prompted to propose that human computer interaction and cognitive ergonomics are largely built on pretending and make believe. If this premise is accepted (and if not, please pretend for a moment), there are a number of interesting consequences.