The role of knowledge facilitators and inhibitors: lessons from airline reservations systems.

Strategic frameworks seeking to explain how an organisation may generate superior performance are numerous. Earlier approaches centred on the competitive position of an organisation within its industry, with subsequent attention focused on an organisation's core competences. More recently, research has concentrated on knowledge and organisational learning. By reference to a study of airline-developed computer reservation systems (CRSs), this article explores the strategic importance of information in creating knowledge to generate superior performance. By examining developments in the use, management and control of information derived from CRSs, evidence is presented to explain how CRS-owning airlines have circumvented regulatory controls and increasingly competition to sustain competitive advantage through the development of their information and knowledge systems. This research demonstrates the need for organisations to develop 'knowledge facilitators' that foster the creation of new knowledge. Equally, managers must develop 'knowledge inhibitors' that help to sustain competitive advantage by limiting the abilities of competitors to create knowledge themselves.

Islamic corporate financing : does it promote profit and loss sharing?

Islamic financing instruments can be categorised into profit and loss/risk sharing and non-participatory instruments. Although profit and loss sharing instruments such as musharakah are widely accepted as the ideal form of Islamic financing, prior studies suggest that alternative instruments such as murabahah are preferred by Islamic banks. Nevertheless, prior studies did not explore factors that influence the use of Islamic financing among non-financial firms. Our study fills this gap and contributes new knowledge in several ways. First, we find no evidence of widespread use of Islamic financing instruments across non-financial firms. This is because the instruments are mostly used by less profitable firms with higher leverage (i.e., risky firms). Second, we find that profit and loss sharing instruments are hardly used, whilst the use of murabahah is dominant. Consistent with the prediction of moral-hazard-risk avoidance theory, further analysis suggests that users with a lower asset base (to serve as collateral) are associated with murabahah financing. Third, we present a critical discourse on the contentious nature of murabahah as practised. The economic significance and ethical issues associated with murabahah as practised should trigger serious efforts to steer Islamic corporate financing towards risk-sharing more than the controversial rent-seeking practice.