It's not interaction, it's make believe.

A principal, but largely unexplored, use of our cognition when using interacting technology involves pretending. To pretend is to believe that which is not the case, for example, when we use the desktop on our personal computer we are pretending, that is, we are pretending that the screen is a desktop upon which windows reside. But, of course, the screen really isn't a desktop. Similarly when we engage in scenario- or persona-based design we are pretending about the settings, narrative, contexts and agents involved. Although there are exceptions, the overwhelming majority of the contents of these different kinds of stories are not the case. We also often pretend when we engage in the evaluation of these technologies (e.g. in the Wizard of Oz technique we "ignore the man behind the curtain"). We are pretending when we ascribe human-like qualities to digital technology. In each we temporarily believe something to be the case which is not. If we add the experience of tele- and social-presence to this, and the diverse experiences which can arise from using digital technology which too are predicted on pretending, then we are prompted to propose that human computer interaction and cognitive ergonomics are largely built on pretending and make believe. If this premise is accepted (and if not, please pretend for a moment), there are a number of interesting consequences.

Islamic corporate financing : does it promote profit and loss sharing?

Islamic financing instruments can be categorised into profit and loss/risk sharing and non-participatory instruments. Although profit and loss sharing instruments such as musharakah are widely accepted as the ideal form of Islamic financing, prior studies suggest that alternative instruments such as murabahah are preferred by Islamic banks. Nevertheless, prior studies did not explore factors that influence the use of Islamic financing among non-financial firms. Our study fills this gap and contributes new knowledge in several ways. First, we find no evidence of widespread use of Islamic financing instruments across non-financial firms. This is because the instruments are mostly used by less profitable firms with higher leverage (i.e., risky firms). Second, we find that profit and loss sharing instruments are hardly used, whilst the use of murabahah is dominant. Consistent with the prediction of moral-hazard-risk avoidance theory, further analysis suggests that users with a lower asset base (to serve as collateral) are associated with murabahah financing. Third, we present a critical discourse on the contentious nature of murabahah as practised. The economic significance and ethical issues associated with murabahah as practised should trigger serious efforts to steer Islamic corporate financing towards risk-sharing more than the controversial rent-seeking practice.