How institutions shaped the last major evolutionary transition to large-scale human societies.

What drove the transition from small-scale human societies centred on kinship and personal exchange, to large-scale societies comprising cooperation and division of labour among untold numbers of unrelated individuals? We propose that the unique human capacity to negotiate institutional rules that coordinate social actions was a key driver of this transition. By creating institutions, humans have been able to move from the default ‘Hobbesian’ rules of the ‘game of life’, determined by physical/environmental constraints, into self-created rules of social organization where cooperation can be individually advantageous even in large groups of unrelated individuals. Examples include rules of food sharing in hunter–gatherers, rules for the usage of irrigation systems in agriculturalists, property rights and systems for sharing reputation between mediaeval traders. Successful institutions create rules of interaction that are self-enforcing, providing direct benefits both to individuals that follow them, and to individuals that sanction rule breakers. Forming institutions requires shared intentionality, language and other cognitive abilities largely absent in other primates. We explain how cooperative breeding likely selected for these abilities early in the Homo lineage. This allowed anatomically modern humans to create institutions that transformed the self-reliance of our primate ancestors into the division of labour of large-scale human social organization.

Exploring the contradictions between Brazil’s role in the global climate change regime and its position in regional environmental governance.

Similar to other developing countries Brazil’s position on climate change emphasises national sovereignty and the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. However, in recent years Brasilia has also announced voluntary reductions in carbon emissions, making Brazil one of the leading emerging countries in its approach to climate change, while enhancing its international reputation and legitimacy. Compared to its neighbours Brazil has older and more developed domestic environmental institutions and movements. Yet, Brazil’s global leadership on climate change does not translate into a similar role in regional environmental governance. In the 2000s Argentina and Uruguay became embroiled in a bitter environmental conflict involving a shared natural resource, the Uruguay River. Brazil not only refused to mediate, but also kept it out of regional forums insisting on the conflict’s bilateral nature. Furthermore, Mercosur’s environmental agenda has progressively become eroded while Brazilian-led Unasur lacks an institutional framework dedicated to environmental concerns. This indicates that environmental concerns are far more important for Brazil’s global image than for its role as a regional leader. It also highlights the limited scope of the climate change negotiations which focus narrowly on reducing carbon emissions, without taking wider concerns over energy generation or environmental and social justice into account. Brazil has promoted hydropower generation, portrayed as “clean” energy. Yet, these projects have sparked strong domestic and regional civil society opposition due to their social and environmental costs which make it difficult for Brazil to claim a regional leadership role on environmental concerns.