Nine for ones in nine: a schizophrenic cyborg love story.

By appropriating the images of the schizophrenic and the cyborg from Deleuze and Guattari, and from Donna Haraway respectively, this paper seeks to discuss the relationship between human and computer, composer and performer in a way that undermines and subverts the normal binaries commonly employed, and even implied in the descriptions of these relationships in this paper. “Nine for ones in nine”, despite employing the use of the OpenMusic software in its composition, retains a degree of choice and indeterminacy for the performers; despite employing the use of precise just harmony in its design and intent, the work depends upon the imprecision of human control rather than ceding to the precision of a synthesiser. Given the vast possibilities opened up to composers by the use of computers to calculate and create sound, why then do composers continue to employ performers in the realisation of their designs, and rely on sometimes hundreds of years-old technology to articulate them in real time? The very social and imprecise aspect of the act of performance is key to the messy, compromised, and complicit product that scores such as Nine for ones in nine aim to produce.

It's not interaction, it's make believe.

A principal, but largely unexplored, use of our cognition when using interacting technology involves pretending. To pretend is to believe that which is not the case, for example, when we use the desktop on our personal computer we are pretending, that is, we are pretending that the screen is a desktop upon which windows reside. But, of course, the screen really isn't a desktop. Similarly when we engage in scenario- or persona-based design we are pretending about the settings, narrative, contexts and agents involved. Although there are exceptions, the overwhelming majority of the contents of these different kinds of stories are not the case. We also often pretend when we engage in the evaluation of these technologies (e.g. in the Wizard of Oz technique we "ignore the man behind the curtain"). We are pretending when we ascribe human-like qualities to digital technology. In each we temporarily believe something to be the case which is not. If we add the experience of tele- and social-presence to this, and the diverse experiences which can arise from using digital technology which too are predicted on pretending, then we are prompted to propose that human computer interaction and cognitive ergonomics are largely built on pretending and make believe. If this premise is accepted (and if not, please pretend for a moment), there are a number of interesting consequences.