It's not interaction, it's make believe.

A principal, but largely unexplored, use of our cognition when using interacting technology involves pretending. To pretend is to believe that which is not the case, for example, when we use the desktop on our personal computer we are pretending, that is, we are pretending that the screen is a desktop upon which windows reside. But, of course, the screen really isn't a desktop. Similarly when we engage in scenario- or persona-based design we are pretending about the settings, narrative, contexts and agents involved. Although there are exceptions, the overwhelming majority of the contents of these different kinds of stories are not the case. We also often pretend when we engage in the evaluation of these technologies (e.g. in the Wizard of Oz technique we "ignore the man behind the curtain"). We are pretending when we ascribe human-like qualities to digital technology. In each we temporarily believe something to be the case which is not. If we add the experience of tele- and social-presence to this, and the diverse experiences which can arise from using digital technology which too are predicted on pretending, then we are prompted to propose that human computer interaction and cognitive ergonomics are largely built on pretending and make believe. If this premise is accepted (and if not, please pretend for a moment), there are a number of interesting consequences.

Rethinking the digital divide: from philanthropy to isonomia..

The digital divide has been, at least until very recently, a major theme in policy as well as interdisciplinary academic circles across the world, as well as at a collective global level, as attested by the World Summit on the Information Society. Numerous research papers and volumes have attempted to conceptualise the digital divide and to offer reasoned prescriptive and normative responses. What has been lacking in many of these studies, it is submitted, is a rigorous negotiation of moral and political philosophy, the result being a failure to situate the digital divide - or rather, more widely, information imbalances - in a holistic understanding of social structures of power and wealth. In practice, prescriptive offerings have been little more than philanthropic in tendency, whether private or corporate philanthropy. Instead, a theory of distributive justice is required, one that recovers the tradition of emancipatory, democratic struggle. This much has been said before. What is new here, however, is that the paper suggests a specific formula, the Rawls-Tawney theorem, as a solution at the level of analytical moral-political philosophy. Building on the work of John Rawls and R. H. Tawney, this avoids both the Charybdis of Marxism and the Scylla of liberalism. It delineates some of the details of the meaning of social justice in the information age. Promulgating a conception of isonomia, which while egalitarian eschews arithmetic equality (the equality of misery), the paper hopes to contribute to the emerging ideal of communicative justice in the media-saturated, post-industrial epoch.