Good is generally more alike than bad in the information ecology: Investigating the case of (the ABC model of) group stereotypes

On most if not all evaluatively relevant dimensions such as the temperature level, taste intensity, and nutritional value of a meal, one range of adequate, positive states is framed by two ranges of inadequate, negative states, namely too much and too little. This distribution of positive and negative states in the information ecology results in a higher similarity of positive objects, people, and events to other positive stimuli as compared to the similarity of negative stimuli to other negative stimuli. In other words, there are fewer ways in which an object, a person, or an event can be positive as compared to negative. Oftentimes, there is only one way in which a stimulus can be positive (e.g., a good meal has to have an adequate temperature level, taste intensity, and nutritional value). In contrast, there are many different ways in which a stimulus can be negative (e.g., a bad meal can be too hot or too cold, too spicy or too bland, or too fat or too lean). This higher similarity of positive as compared to negative stimuli is important, as similarity greatly impacts speed and accuracy on virtually all levels of information processing, including attention, classification, categorization, judgment and decision making, and recognition and recall memory. Thus, if the difference in similarity between positive and negative stimuli is a general phenomenon, it predicts and may explain a variety of valence asymmetries in cognitive processing (e.g., positive as compared to negative stimuli are processed faster but less accurately). In my dissertation, I show that the similarity asymmetry is indeed a general phenomenon that is observed in thousands of words and pictures. Further, I show that the similarity asymmetry applies to social groups. Groups stereotyped as average on the two dimensions agency / socio-economic success (A) and conservative-progressive beliefs (B) are stereotyped as positive or high on communion (C), while groups stereotyped as extreme on A and B (e.g., managers, homeless people, punks, and religious people) are stereotyped as negative or low on C. As average groups are more similar to one another than extreme groups, according to this ABC model of group stereotypes, positive groups are mentally represented as more similar to one another than negative groups. Finally, I discuss implications of the ABC model of group stereotypes, pointing to avenues for future research on how stereotype content shapes social perception, cognition, and behavior.