Towards a grammar of the senses: perception in Lushese (Olussese)

The thesis presents the grammar of the Eastern African Bantu language Lushese (Olussese), spoken in Uganda, and gives information on the historical background that caused the today´s highly endangered status of the language (chapters 1 & 2). Focussing on the semantics of the verbs of perception, the thesis presents the use and meaning of various linguistic means for expressing perception in general and further for the expression of physical, sensory, emotional and cognitive experience in Lushese (chapters 3-5). The findings in Lushese provide insights of the use of language in the light of social interaction and include information on the ways cultural and social values impact the choice of linguistic means (chapter 6). With respect to the theoretical issues concerning the language of perception the data in Lushese show that the way people speak about the environment and use language to express categories of perception are rather a matter of innate cultural interpretation regarding the human body and the environment than a matter of the human body and the environment as given by biological and/or physical conditions.

The potential of symbolic approximation. Disentangling the effects of approximation vs. calculation demands in nonsymbolic and symbolic representations.

Mathematical skills that we acquire during formal education mostly entail exact numerical processing. Besides this specifically human faculty, an additional system exists to represent and manipulate quantities in an approximate manner. We share this innate approximate number system (ANS) with other nonhuman animals and are able to use it to process large numerosities long before we can master the formal algorithms taught in school. Dehaene´s (1992) Triple Code Model (TCM) states that also after the onset of formal education, approximate processing is carried out in this analogue magnitude code no matter if the original problem was presented nonsymbolically or symbolically. Despite the wide acceptance of the model, most research only uses nonsymbolic tasks to assess ANS acuity. Due to this silent assumption that genuine approximation can only be tested with nonsymbolic presentations, up to now important implications in research domains of high practical relevance remain unclear, and existing potential is not fully exploited. For instance, it has been found that nonsymbolic approximation can predict math achievement one year later (Gilmore, McCarthy, & Spelke, 2010), that it is robust against the detrimental influence of learners´ socioeconomic status (SES), and that it is suited to foster performance in exact arithmetic in the short-term (Hyde, Khanum, & Spelke, 2014). We provided evidence that symbolic approximation might be equally and in some cases even better suited to generate predictions and foster more formal math skills independently of SES. In two longitudinal studies, we realized exact and approximate arithmetic tasks in both a nonsymbolic and a symbolic format. With first graders, we demonstrated that performance in symbolic approximation at the beginning of term was the only measure consistently not varying according to children´s SES, and among both approximate tasks it was the better predictor for math achievement at the end of first grade. In part, the strong connection seems to come about from mediation through ordinal skills. In two further experiments, we tested the suitability of both approximation formats to induce an arithmetic principle in elementary school children. We found that symbolic approximation was equally effective in making children exploit the additive law of commutativity in a subsequent formal task as a direct instruction. Nonsymbolic approximation on the other hand had no beneficial effect. The positive influence of the symbolic approximate induction was strongest in children just starting school and decreased with age. However, even third graders still profited from the induction. The results show that also symbolic problems can be processed as genuine approximation, but that beyond that they have their own specific value with regard to didactic-educational concerns. Our findings furthermore demonstrate that the two often con-founded factors ꞌformatꞌ and ꞌdemanded accuracyꞌ cannot be disentangled easily in first graders numerical understanding, but that children´s SES also influences existing interrelations between the different abilities tested here.

Good is generally more alike than bad in the information ecology: Investigating the case of (the ABC model of) group stereotypes

On most if not all evaluatively relevant dimensions such as the temperature level, taste intensity, and nutritional value of a meal, one range of adequate, positive states is framed by two ranges of inadequate, negative states, namely too much and too little. This distribution of positive and negative states in the information ecology results in a higher similarity of positive objects, people, and events to other positive stimuli as compared to the similarity of negative stimuli to other negative stimuli. In other words, there are fewer ways in which an object, a person, or an event can be positive as compared to negative. Oftentimes, there is only one way in which a stimulus can be positive (e.g., a good meal has to have an adequate temperature level, taste intensity, and nutritional value). In contrast, there are many different ways in which a stimulus can be negative (e.g., a bad meal can be too hot or too cold, too spicy or too bland, or too fat or too lean). This higher similarity of positive as compared to negative stimuli is important, as similarity greatly impacts speed and accuracy on virtually all levels of information processing, including attention, classification, categorization, judgment and decision making, and recognition and recall memory. Thus, if the difference in similarity between positive and negative stimuli is a general phenomenon, it predicts and may explain a variety of valence asymmetries in cognitive processing (e.g., positive as compared to negative stimuli are processed faster but less accurately). In my dissertation, I show that the similarity asymmetry is indeed a general phenomenon that is observed in thousands of words and pictures. Further, I show that the similarity asymmetry applies to social groups. Groups stereotyped as average on the two dimensions agency / socio-economic success (A) and conservative-progressive beliefs (B) are stereotyped as positive or high on communion (C), while groups stereotyped as extreme on A and B (e.g., managers, homeless people, punks, and religious people) are stereotyped as negative or low on C. As average groups are more similar to one another than extreme groups, according to this ABC model of group stereotypes, positive groups are mentally represented as more similar to one another than negative groups. Finally, I discuss implications of the ABC model of group stereotypes, pointing to avenues for future research on how stereotype content shapes social perception, cognition, and behavior.