A comparison of deterministic, reliability-based and risk-based structural optimization under uncertainty

In this paper, the effects of uncertainty and expected costs of failure on optimum structural design are investigated, by comparing three distinct formulations of structural optimization problems. Deterministic Design Optimization (DDO) allows one the find the shape or configuration of a structure that is optimum in terms of mechanics, but the formulation grossly neglects parameter uncertainty and its effects on structural safety. Reliability-based Design Optimization (RBDO) has emerged as an alternative to properly model the safety-under-uncertainty part of the problem. With RBDO, one can ensure that a minimum (and measurable) level of safety is achieved by the optimum structure. However, results are dependent on the failure probabilities used as constraints in the analysis. Risk optimization (RO) increases the scope of the problem by addressing the compromising goals of economy and safety. This is accomplished by quantifying the monetary consequences of failure, as well as the costs associated with construction, operation and maintenance. RO yields the optimum topology and the optimum point of balance between economy and safety. Results are compared for some example problems. The broader RO solution is found first, and optimum results are used as constraints in DDO and RBDO. Results show that even when optimum safety coefficients are used as constraints in DDO, the formulation leads to configurations which respect these design constraints, reduce manufacturing costs but increase total expected costs (including expected costs of failure). When (optimum) system failure probability is used as a constraint in RBDO, this solution also reduces manufacturing costs but by increasing total expected costs. This happens when the costs associated with different failure modes are distinct. Hence, a general equivalence between the formulations cannot be established. Optimum structural design considering expected costs of failure cannot be controlled solely by safety factors nor by failure probability constraints, but will depend on actual structural configuration. (c) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Safety illusion and error trap in a collectively-operated machine accident

Workplace accidents involving machines are relevant for their magnitude and their impacts on worker health. Despite consolidated critical statements, explanation centered on errors of operators remains predominant with industry professionals, hampering preventive measures and the improvement of production-system reliability. Several initiatives were adopted by enforcement agencies in partnership with universities to stimulate production and diffusion of analysis methodologies with a systemic approach. Starting from one accident case that occurred with a worker who operated a brake-clutch type mechanical press, the article explores cognitive aspects and the existence of traps in the operation of this machine. It deals with a large-sized press that, despite being endowed with a light curtain in areas of access to the pressing zone, did not meet legal requirements. The safety devices gave rise to an illusion of safety, permitting activation of the machine when a worker was still found within the operational zone. Preventive interventions must stimulate the tailoring of systems to the characteristics of workers, minimizing the creation of traps and encouraging safety policies and practices that replace judgments of behaviors that participate in accidents by analyses of reasons that lead workers to act in that manner.

A phase I randomized, double-blind, controlled trial of 2009 influenza A (H1N1) inactivated monovalent vaccines with different adjuvant systems

Methods We conducted a phase I, multicenter, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, multi-arm (10) parallel study involving healthy adults to evaluate the safety and immunogenicity of influenza A (H1N1) 2009 non-adjuvanted and adjuvanted candidate vaccines. Subjects received two intramuscular injections of one of the candidate vaccines administered 21 days apart. Antibody responses were measured by means of hemagglutination-inhibition assay before and 21 days after each vaccination. The three co-primary immunogenicity end points were the proportion of seroprotection >70%, seroconversion >40%, and the factor increase in the geometric mean titer >2.5. Results A total of 266 participants were enrolled into the study. No deaths or serious adverse events were reported. The most commonly solicited local and systemic adverse events were injection-site pain and headache, respectively. Only three subjects (1.1%) reported severe injection-site pain. Four 2009 influenza A (H1N1) inactivated monovalent candidate vaccines that met the three requirements to evaluate influenza protection, after a single dose, were identified: 15 μg of hemagglutinin antigen without adjuvant; 7.5 μg of hemagglutinin antigen with aluminum hydroxide, MPL and squalene; 3.75 μg of hemagglutinin antigen with aluminum hydroxide and MPL; and 3.75 μg of hemagglutinin antigen with aluminum hydroxide and squalene. Conclusions Adjuvant systems can be safely used in influenza vaccines, including the adjuvant monophosphoryl lipid A (MPL) derived from Bordetella pertussis with squalene and aluminum hydroxide, MPL with aluminum hydroxide, and squalene and aluminum hydroxide.