2 resultados para politics of banking
em Biblioteca Digital da Produção Intelectual da Universidade de São Paulo
Resumo:
Over the last decade, Brazil has pioneered an innovative model of branchless banking, known as correspondent banking, involving distribution partnership between banks, several kinds of retailers and a variety of other participants, which have allowed an unprecedented growth in bank outreach and became a reference worldwide. However, despite the extensive number of studies recently developed focusing on Brazilian branchless banking, there exists a clear research gap in the literature. It is still necessary to identify the different business configurations involving network integration through which the branchless banking channel can be structured, as well as the way they relate to the range of bank services delivered. Given this gap, our objective is to investigate the relationship between network integration models and services delivered through the branchless banking channel. Based on twenty interviews with managers involved with the correspondent banking business and data collected on almost 300 correspondent locations, our research is developed in two steps. First, we created a qualitative taxonomy through which we identified three classes of network integration models. Second, we performed a cluster analysis to explain the groups of financial services that fit each model. By contextualizing correspondents' network integration processes through the lens of transaction costs economics, our results suggest that the more suited to deliver social-oriented, "pro-poor'' services the channel is, the more it is controlled by banks. This research offers contributions to managers and policy makers interested in understanding better how different correspondent banking configurations are related with specific portfolios of services. Researchers interested in the subject of branchless banking can also benefit from the taxonomy presented and the transaction costs analysis of this kind of banking channel, which has been adopted in a number of developing countries all over the world now. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
This paper addresses the effects of bank competition on the risk-taking behaviors of banks in 10 Latin American countries between 2003 and 2008. We conduct our empirical approach in two steps. First, we estimate the Boone indicator, which is a measure of competition. We then regress this measure and other explanatory variables on the banking "stability inefficiency" derived simultaneously from the estimation of a stability stochastic frontier. Unlike previous findings, this paper concludes that competition affects risk-taking behavior in a non-linear way as both high and low competition levels enhance financial stability, while we find the opposite effect for average competition. In addition, bank size and capitalization are essential factors in explaining this relationship. On the one hand, the larger a bank is, the more it benefits from competition. On the other hand, a greater capital ratio is advantageous for banks that operate in collusive markets, while capitalization only enhances the stability of larger banks under high and average competition. These results are of extreme importance when considering bank regulations, especially in light of the recent turmoil in the global financial markets. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.