Characterization of atypical Listeria innocua isolated from swine slaughterhouses and meat markets

Atypical Listeria innocua strains presenting phenotypic characteristics similar to those of Listeria monocyto genes were recently isolated from food and the environment. These isolates also tested positive for virulence genes specific to L. monocytogenes. Here we report the isolation of atypical hemolytic L. innocua strains from the environment of pork processing plants in Brazil. The strains were positive for L. monocytogenes virulence genes hly, inlA and inlB by PCR and presented genotypic similarities with human isolates of L. monocytogenes via the AFLP technique using HindIII single enzyme protocol. Phenotypic and genotypic similarities suggest that these atypical L. innocua may be pathogenic strains. (C) 2012 Institut Pasteur. Published by Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.

Arbitrage-Free Conditions and Hedging Strategies for Markets with Penalty Costs on Short Positions

We consider a discrete-time financial model in a general sample space with penalty costs on short positions. We consider a friction market closely related to the standard one except that withdrawals from the portfolio value proportional to short positions are made. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the nonexistence of arbitrages in this situation and for a self-financing strategy to replicate a contingent claim. For the finite-sample space case, this result leads to an explicit and constructive procedure for obtaining perfect hedging strategies.

A Note on Large Deviations for the Stable Marriage of Poisson and Lebesgue with Random Appetites

Let IaS,a"e (d) be a set of centers chosen according to a Poisson point process in a"e (d) . Let psi be an allocation of a"e (d) to I in the sense of the Gale-Shapley marriage problem, with the additional feature that every center xi aI has an appetite given by a nonnegative random variable alpha. Generalizing some previous results, we study large deviations for the distance of a typical point xaa"e (d) to its center psi(x)aI, subject to some restrictions on the moments of alpha.

A further note on the college admission game

When a stable matching rule is used for a college admission market, questions on incentives facing agents of both sides of the market naturally emerge. This note states and proves four important results which fill a gap in the theory of incentives for the college admission model. Two of them have never been demonstrated but have been used along the years and are responsible for the success that this theory has had in explaining empirical economic phenomena.