A further note on the college admission game

When a stable matching rule is used for a college admission market, questions on incentives facing agents of both sides of the market naturally emerge. This note states and proves four important results which fill a gap in the theory of incentives for the college admission model. Two of them have never been demonstrated but have been used along the years and are responsible for the success that this theory has had in explaining empirical economic phenomena.

Fidelity and game-based technology in management education

This study explores educational technology and management education by analyzing fidelity in game-based management education interventions. A sample of 31 MBA students was selected to help answer the research question: To what extent do MBA students tend to recognize specific game-based academic experiences, in terms of fidelity, as relevant to their managerial performance? Two distinct game-based interventions (BG1 and BG2) with key differences in fidelity levels were explored: BG1 presented higher physical and functional fidelity levels and lower psychological fidelity levels. Hypotheses were tested with data from the participants, collected shortly after their experiences, related to the overall perceived quality of game-based interventions. The findings reveal a higher overall perception of quality towards BG1: (a) better for testing strategies, (b) offering better business and market models, (c) based on a pace that better stimulates learning, and (d) presenting a fidelity level that better supports real world performance. This study fosters the conclusion that MBA students tend to recognize, to a large extent, that specific game-based academic experiences are relevant and meaningful to their managerial development, mostly with heightened fidelity levels of adopted artifacts. Agents must be ready and motivated to explore the new, to try and err, and to learn collaboratively in order to perform.