The structure and resilience of financial market networks

Financial markets can be viewed as a highly complex evolving system that is very sensitive to economic instabilities. The complex organization of the market can be represented in a suitable fashion in terms of complex networks, which can be constructed from stock prices such that each pair of stocks is connected by a weighted edge that encodes the distance between them. In this work, we propose an approach to analyze the topological and dynamic evolution of financial networks based on the stock correlation matrices. An entropy-related measurement is adopted to quantify the robustness of the evolving financial market organization. It is verified that the network topological organization suffers strong variation during financial instabilities and the networks in such periods become less robust. A statistical robust regression model is proposed to quantity the relationship between the network structure and resilience. The obtained coefficients of such model indicate that the average shortest path length is the measurement most related to network resilience coefficient. This result indicates that a collective behavior is observed between stocks during financial crisis. More specifically, stocks tend to synchronize their price evolution, leading to a high correlation between pair of stock prices, which contributes to the increase in distance between them and, consequently, decrease the network resilience. (C) 2012 American Institute of Physics. [doi:10.1063/1.3683467]

The relationship between banking market competition and risk-taking: Do size and capitalization matter?

This paper addresses the effects of bank competition on the risk-taking behaviors of banks in 10 Latin American countries between 2003 and 2008. We conduct our empirical approach in two steps. First, we estimate the Boone indicator, which is a measure of competition. We then regress this measure and other explanatory variables on the banking "stability inefficiency" derived simultaneously from the estimation of a stability stochastic frontier. Unlike previous findings, this paper concludes that competition affects risk-taking behavior in a non-linear way as both high and low competition levels enhance financial stability, while we find the opposite effect for average competition. In addition, bank size and capitalization are essential factors in explaining this relationship. On the one hand, the larger a bank is, the more it benefits from competition. On the other hand, a greater capital ratio is advantageous for banks that operate in collusive markets, while capitalization only enhances the stability of larger banks under high and average competition. These results are of extreme importance when considering bank regulations, especially in light of the recent turmoil in the global financial markets. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Arbitrage-Free Conditions and Hedging Strategies for Markets with Penalty Costs on Short Positions

We consider a discrete-time financial model in a general sample space with penalty costs on short positions. We consider a friction market closely related to the standard one except that withdrawals from the portfolio value proportional to short positions are made. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the nonexistence of arbitrages in this situation and for a self-financing strategy to replicate a contingent claim. For the finite-sample space case, this result leads to an explicit and constructive procedure for obtaining perfect hedging strategies.