Predation of Caiman yacare (Spix, 1825) (Crocodilia, Alligatoridae) by Busarellus nigricollis (Latham, 1790) (Accipitriformes, Accipitridae) in the Taiama Ecological Station, Alto Pantanal, State of Mato Grosso

Predation of Caiman yacare (Spix, 1825) (Crocodilia, Alligatoridae) by Busarellus nigricollis (Latham, 1790) (Accipitriformes, Accipitridae) in the Taiama Ecological Station, Alto Pantanal, State of Mato Grosso. The Black-collared Hawk Busarellus nigricollis is an Accipitridae commonly seen on river banks, lagoon shores, and marshy areas. It feeds mainly on fishes and aquatic insects. It hunts from dead tree branches at forest edges or emergent trunks in flooded areas. Detailed information about the Black-collared Hawk food habits is scarce. In this study, we describe the predation of Caiman yacare (Pantanal alligator) by an individual of B. nigricollis. The event was observed on 20 August 2010 at 10: 14 am, in the Taiama Ecological Station, municipality of Caceres, Alto Pantanal, state of Mato Grosso. The B. nigricollis individual was seen leaving the Paraguay River carrying a juvenile C. yacare around 40 cm long. The prey was torn apart and given to a Black-collared Hawk nestling sitting atop a nest in flooded forest, ca. 15 m way from the river bank. This is the first published record of Pantanal alligator predation by the Black-collared Hawk.

'Beheading', Rule Manipulation and Fraud: The Approval of Election Results in Brazil, 1894-1930

Studies of electoral fraud tend to focus their analyses only on the pre-electoral or electoral phases. By examining the Brazilian First Republic (1889-1930), this article shifts the focus to a later phase, discussing a particular type of electoral fraud that has been little explored by the literature, namely, that perpetrated by the legislatures themselves during the process of giving final approval to election results. The Brazilian case is interesting because of a practice known as degola ('beheading') whereby electoral results were altered when Congress decided on which deputies to certify as duly elected. This has come to be seen as a widespread and standard practice in this period. However, this article shows that this final phase of rubber-stamping or overturning election results was important not because of the number of degolas, which was actually much lower than the literature would have us believe, but chiefly because of their strategic use during moments of political uncertainty. It argues that the congressional certification of electoral results was deployed as a key tool in ensuring the political stability of the Republican regime in the absence of an electoral court.