Novelty, but Not Operant Aversive Learning, Enhances Fos and Egr-1 Expression in the Medial Prefrontal Cortex and Hippocampal Areas of Rats

Immediate early genes (IEG) are presumed to be activated in response to stress, novelty, and learning. Evidence supports the involvement of prefrontal and hippocampal areas in stress and learning, but also in the detection of novel events. This study examined whether a previous experience with shocks changes the pattern of Fos and Egr-1 expression in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the hippocampal cornus ammonis 1 (CA1), and dentate gyrus (DG) of adult male Wistar rats that learned to escape in an operant aversive test. Subjects previously exposed to inescapable footshocks that learned to escape from Shocks were assigned to the treated group (EXP). Subjects from Group Novelty (NOV) rested undisturbed during treatment and also learned to escape in the test. The nonshock group (NSH) rested undisturbed in both sessions. Standard immunohistochemistry procedures were used to detect the proteins in brain sections. The results show that a previous experience with shocks changed the pattern of IEG expression, then demonstrating c-fos and egr-1 induction as experience-dependent events. Compared with NSH and EXP an enhanced Fos expression was detected in the mPFC and CA1 subfield of Group NOV, which also exhibited increased Egr-1 expression in the mPFC and DG in comparison to NSH. No differences were found in the DG for Fos, or in the CA1 for Egr-1. Novelty, and not the operant aversive escape learning, seems to have generated IEG induction. The results suggest novel stimuli as a possible confounding factor in studies on Fos and/or Egr-1 expression in aversive conditions.

Bias and learning in temporal binding: intervals between actions and outcomes are compressed by prior bias

It has consistently been shown that agents judge the intervals between their actions and outcomes as compressed in time, an effect named intentional binding. In the present work, we investigated whether this effect is result of prior bias volunteers have about the timing of the consequences of their actions, or if it is due to learning that occurs during the experimental session. Volunteers made temporal estimates of the interval between their action and target onset (Action conditions), or between two events (No-Action conditions). Our results show that temporal estimates become shorter throughout each experimental block in both conditions. Moreover, we found that observers judged intervals between action and outcomes as shorter even in very early trials of each block. To quantify the decrease of temporal judgments in experimental blocks, exponential functions were fitted to participants’ temporal judgments. The fitted parameters suggest that observers had different prior biases as to intervals between events in which action was involved. These findings suggest that prior bias might play a more important role in this effect than calibration-type learning processes.