Towards automated first-order abduction: the cut-based approach

Traditional abduction imposes as a precondition the restriction that the background information may not derive the goal data. In first-order logic such precondition is, in general, undecidable. To avoid such problem, we present a first-order cut-based abduction method, which has KE-tableaux as its underlying inference system. This inference system allows for the automation of non-analytic proofs in a tableau setting, which permits a generalization of traditional abduction that avoids the undecidable precondition problem. After demonstrating the correctness of the method, we show how this method can be dynamically iterated in a process that leads to the construction of non-analytic first-order proofs and, in some terminating cases, to refutations as well.

Revisiting the Security of the ALRED Design and Two of Its Variants: Marvin and LetterSoup

The ALRED construction is a lightweight strategy for constructing message authentication algorithms from an underlying iterated block cipher. Even though this construction's original analyses show that it is secure against some attacks, the absence of formal security proofs in a strong security model still brings uncertainty on its robustness. In this paper, aiming to give a better understanding of the security level provided by different authentication algorithms based on this design strategy, we formally analyze two ALRED variants-the MARVIN message authentication code and the LETTERSOUP authenticated-encryption scheme,-bounding their security as a function of the attacker's resources and of the underlying cipher's characteristics.