Particle Competition and Cooperation in Networks for Semi-Supervised Learning

Semi-supervised learning is one of the important topics in machine learning, concerning with pattern classification where only a small subset of data is labeled. In this paper, a new network-based (or graph-based) semi-supervised classification model is proposed. It employs a combined random-greedy walk of particles, with competition and cooperation mechanisms, to propagate class labels to the whole network. Due to the competition mechanism, the proposed model has a local label spreading fashion, i.e., each particle only visits a portion of nodes potentially belonging to it, while it is not allowed to visit those nodes definitely occupied by particles of other classes. In this way, a "divide-and-conquer" effect is naturally embedded in the model. As a result, the proposed model can achieve a good classification rate while exhibiting low computational complexity order in comparison to other network-based semi-supervised algorithms. Computer simulations carried out for synthetic and real-world data sets provide a numeric quantification of the performance of the method.

The relationship between banking market competition and risk-taking: Do size and capitalization matter?

This paper addresses the effects of bank competition on the risk-taking behaviors of banks in 10 Latin American countries between 2003 and 2008. We conduct our empirical approach in two steps. First, we estimate the Boone indicator, which is a measure of competition. We then regress this measure and other explanatory variables on the banking "stability inefficiency" derived simultaneously from the estimation of a stability stochastic frontier. Unlike previous findings, this paper concludes that competition affects risk-taking behavior in a non-linear way as both high and low competition levels enhance financial stability, while we find the opposite effect for average competition. In addition, bank size and capitalization are essential factors in explaining this relationship. On the one hand, the larger a bank is, the more it benefits from competition. On the other hand, a greater capital ratio is advantageous for banks that operate in collusive markets, while capitalization only enhances the stability of larger banks under high and average competition. These results are of extreme importance when considering bank regulations, especially in light of the recent turmoil in the global financial markets. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.