Adapting Victorian Gypsies for the Screen: Ethnicity, Otherness and (In)visibility in Neo-Victorian Popular Film

This paper aims at analysing the presence of gypsy characters in two neo-Victorian popular films, namely Joe Johnston’s The Wolfman (2010) and Guy Ritchie’s Sherlock Holmes: Game of Shadows (2011). The cultural construction of nineteenth-century gypsies, those “Others within Europe” (Boyarin 433) whose presence in Victorian fiction was peripheral, spectral and at times invisible (Nord 3-4), is simultaneously exploited and contested by these two neo-Victorian screen narratives to raise issues of otherness and invisibility on the screen. Setting off from the premise that screen texts, just like print texts, can also be participant in the neo-Victorian project of reimagining the underside of Victorian culture for contemporary audiences (Whelehan 273), this paper traces how the adaptation of Victorian gypsies for the screen, true to the palimpsestuous potential inherent to the process of adaptation (Hutcheon 6) and sharing the double drive between past and present which characterises the neo-Victorian genre (Arias and Pulham xiii; Shiller 539), hybridises our cultural memory of the Victorian Age on the screen while concurrently raises concerns over the persistent liminal status of gypsies in contemporary European culture. In particular, this paper illustrates how the tropes prototypically associated to gypsies (namely their nomadic lifestyle, mysticism, alienated existence or their perceived association to criminality) which can be traced back to Victorian culture are deployed on the neo-Victorian popular screen (with varyingly succesful outcomes) to comment on their (in)visibility in the European popular imagination.

What toleration means to contemporary liberalism?

Toleration is a key concept of liberalism, both from the historical and conceptual points of view. On the other hand, as people’s freedom to live according to their moral and religious ideas has long become a basic value for liberal societies and their political constitutions, it is reasonable to understand that there is nothing to be tolerated nor by citizens neither by the State. However, a part of the scope and meaning of the fundamental rights and freedoms is subject to what John Rawls calls reasonable disagreements and this is a field where toleration understood in the classic way is compatible with equality: not to intervene against that which is being disapproved understood has a raison d'être. Since the 1980s, toleration has been present in the debates on how to deal with pluralism in a constitutional democracy. This has to be connected to the rise of identity politics: political and intellectual movements such as multiculturalism or comunitarism that questioned whether social order based on neutral criteria was either possible or desirable or both things at the same time. Outstanding liberal philosophers were among those demanding political priority for comunitarian values and those who showed interest for toleration as a key concept to articulate pluralism. Key distinctions between them can be explained as the result of the different approaches they take when facing classical theories on toleration: whereas John Locke’s is a major influence on Rawls, John Stuart Mill’s is on the others, while Gray, Walzer and Rorty follow Isaiah Berlin’s reading of Mill.