Eleição nas escolas: uma análise do impacto do diretor eleito sobre o desempenho educacional no Estado da Bahia

In Brazil, the selection of school principals is set in a decentralized manner by each state and city, such that processes may vary with time for a specific locality. In the state of Bahia, school principals were appointed by a higher political hierarchy until 2008, when schools under state administration started selecting principals by elections. The main goal of this work is to evaluate whether changing this specific rule affected students proficiency levels. This is achieved by using a panel data and difference-in-differences approachs that compares state schools (treatment group) to city schools (control group) that did not face a selection rule change and thus kept having their principals politically appointed. The databases used are Prova Brasil 2007, 2009 and 2011, the first one prior and the other two former to the policy change. Our results suggest that students attending schools with principals that are selected and elected have slightly lower mean proficiency levels both in mathematics and in portuguese exams than those attending schools with appointed principals. This result, according to the literature, could be related to perverse effects of selecting school administrators by vote, such as corporatism, clientelism and politicization of the school environment

A Corrupção burocrática inibe o empreendedorismo? uma análise empírica dos estados brasileiros

This work aims to investigate the relationship between the entrepreneurship and the incidence of bureaucratic corruption in the states of Brazil and Federal District. The main hypothesis of this study is that the opening of a business in Brazilian states is negatively affected by the incidence of corruption. The theoretical reference is divided into Entrepreneurship and bureaucratic corruption, with an emphasis on materialistic perspective (objectivist) of entrepreneurship and the effects of bureaucratic corruption on entrepreneurial activity. By the regression method with panel data, we estimated the models with pooled data and fixed and random effects. To measure corruption, I used the General Index of Corruption for the Brazilian states (BOLL, 2010), and to represent entrepreneurship, firm entry per capita by state. Tests (Chow, Hausman and Breusch-Pagan) indicate that the random effects model is more appropriate, and the preliminary results indicate a positive impact of bureaucratic corruption on entrepreneurial activity, contradicting the hypothesis expected and found in previous articles to Brazil, and corroborating the proposition of Dreher and Gassebner (2011) that, in countries with high regulation, bureaucratic corruption can be grease in the wheels of entrepreneurship